The South After Shelby County by Stephanopoulos, Nicholas
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers Working Papers
2013
The South After Shelby County
Nicholas Stephanopoulos
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/
public_law_and_legal_theory
Part of the Law Commons
Chicago Unbound includes both works in progress and final versions of articles. Please be aware that
a more recent version of this article may be available on Chicago Unbound, SSRN or elsewhere.
This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Working Papers at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Public
Law and Legal Theory Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact
unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Nicholas Stephanopoulos, "The South After Shelby County" (University of Chicago Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No.
451, 2013).
CHICAGO 
PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER NO. 451 
 
 
THE SOUTH AFTER SHELBY COUNTY 
 
Nicholas Stephanopoulos 
 
 
 
THE LAW SCHOOL 
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
 
October 2013 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge at the Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series:  
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/academics/publiclaw/index.html 
and The Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection. 
 
 
THE SOUTH AFTER SHELBY COUNTY 
 
 
Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos* 
 
 
In Shelby County v. Holder, the Supreme Court dismantled one of the two pillars of the 
Voting Rights Act:  Section 5, which had barred southern jurisdictions from changing their 
election laws without receiving prior federal approval.  But the Court left standing the VRA’s 
other pillar:  Section 2, which prohibits racial discrimination in voting throughout the country.  
The burning question in the wake of Shelby County is what will happen to minority 
representation in the South now that Section 5 has been struck down but Section 2 lives on.  This 
Article is the first to address this vital issue. 
 
The Article explores the Section 2 – Section 5 gap with respect to both the procedure and 
the substance of voting rights litigation.  Procedurally, the provisions differ in their allocation of 
the burden of proof, their default before a decision on the merits is reached, and their 
proceedings’  cost.    These  differences  mean  that  numerous  policies  that  previously  would  have  
been blocked now will go into effect.  In the first substantive area to which the VRA applies, vote 
dilution, the provisions diverge as well.  Section 2 does not extend to bizarrely shaped districts 
or districts whose minority populations are overly heterogeneous or below 50% in size.  In 
contrast, Section 5 applies to all of these district types.  According to my empirical analysis, 
more than one-third of all formerly protected districts in the South now may be eliminated with 
legal impunity.  In the other substantive area covered by the VRA, vote denial, the provisions 
again vary in their scope.  A mere statistical disparity between minorities and whites does not 
violate Section 2, but it typically does suffice for preclearance to be denied.  The rash of 
franchise restrictions enacted by southern states in the months since Shelby County shows how 
much this distinction matters. 
 
The Article also considers some of the ways in which the Section 2 – Section 5 gap could 
be closed.  A new coverage formula could be adopted, thus restoring the prior regime.  The 
VRA’s  “bail  in”  provision  could  be  amended  to make it easier to subject jurisdictions to 
preclearance through litigation.  Or Section 2 could be revised so that it resembles the stricken 
Section 5 more closely.  Unfortunately, all of these steps face serious legal and political 
obstacles.  A divided Congress is unlikely to pass legislation touching on sensitive issues of race 
and political power.  Likewise, the Court may be reluctant to allow Shelby County to be 
circumvented.  The Section 2 – Section 5 gap thus will probably persist for the foreseeable 
future. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
  For almost half a century, minority representation in America rested on two legal pillars. 
The first, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), applies nationwide and prohibits practices 
that  “result[]  in  a  denial  or  abridgement  of  the  right  .  .  .  to  vote on  account  of  race  or  color.”1 It is 
a relatively conventional provision that creates a cause of action for plaintiffs who have been 
subjected to racial vote dilution or denial. The second, Section 5 of the VRA, applies only to the 
(mostly southern) jurisdictions specified in Section 4, and bans practices that have the purpose or 
effect  of  “denying  or  abridging  the  right  to  vote  on  account  of  race  or  color.”2 Despite its almost 
identical language, Section 5 is a highly unusual provision that prevents covered jurisdictions 
from implementing any changes to their voting laws unless they first have convinced the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) or a federal court that the changes will not worsen the electoral 
position of minority voters.3 
 
 On the penultimate day of the 2012-2013 term, the Supreme Court dismantled the second 
of these two pillars. In Shelby County v Holder, the Court held that Section 4 of the VRA, which 
contains the formula identifying the  jurisdictions  that  are  subject  to  Section  5’s  preclearance  
requirement, is unconstitutional.4 According to the Court, the Section 4 formula is both 
obsolete—“based  on  decades-old  data  and  eradicated  practices”5—and irrational because 
covered areas no longer perform worse than their non-covered peers along the formula’s  metrics  
                                                 
1 42 USC § 1973(a). 
2 Id § 1973c(a); see also id § 1973b(b) (specifying coverage formula of Section 4). 
3 See id § 1973c(a). 
4 Shelby Cty v Holder,133 S Ct 2612 (2013). 
5 Id at 2627. 
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of voter registration and turnout.6 Congress therefore exceeded its enforcement powers under the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments when it reenacted Section 4 in 2006. Section 5 continues 
to be good law, but it has been rendered a zombie provision, no longer applicable to any 
jurisdiction, by the demise of Section 4. 
 
 An urgent question in the wake of Shelby County (and the subject of this Article) is what 
will happen now to minority representation in the areas that formerly were covered by Section 5. 
The question, in other words, is how large the gap is between Section 2, which continues to 
apply nationwide, and Section 5. Is the gap quite small, in which case minority representation in 
the South will be largely unaffected? Or is the gap more like a chasm, in which case the political 
influence of minority groups will be sharply curtailed? The answer is crucial to determining the 
electoral implications of Shelby County for the minorities  who  are  the  VRA’s  intended 
beneficiaries. The answer also is highly relevant to whether and how Congress should respond to 
the Court’s  neutering of Section 5. 
 
 Surprisingly, the existing literature has not explored in detail how Section 2 and Section 5 
interrelate. Indeed, some scholars have elided the distinctions between the provisions and argued 
that  they  both  can  be  “understood  to  require  the  creation  of  majority-minority districts whenever 
possible.”7 When academics have explicitly addressed the space between Section 2 and Section 
5, they have tended to conclude (without much elaboration) that it is not very large. For instance, 
Samuel  Issacharoff  has  written  that,  in  the  absence  of  Section  5,  his  “suspicion is that the 
combination of [S]ection 2, . . . the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the fact of 
being in the process and at the table would afford much protection”  to  minority  groups.8 Justice 
Kennedy expressed a similar sentiment at the Shelby County oral argument, declaring that “it’s  
not  clear  to  me  that  there’s that much difference [between] a Section 2 suit now and 
preclearance.”9 
 
 In this Article, then, I carry out a conceptual, empirical, and political investigation of the 
gap between Section 2 and Section 5. I analyze, that is, how the provisions differ in their formal 
operation, what kinds (and quantities) of practices are permitted by Section 2 but barred by 
Section 5, and which of these practices are likely to be enacted by the jurisdictions that now are 
free from Section  5’s  constraints. My analysis covers both the procedural aspects of voting rights 
litigation and the substance of minority representation. On the substantive side, I discuss both 
vote dilution (redistricting in particular) and the recent wave of franchise restrictions that 
                                                 
6 See id at 2627-29. 
7 Adam B. Cox and Richard T. Holden, Reconsidering Racial and Partisan Gerrymandering, 78 U Chi L 
Rev 553, 577 (2011); see also, for example, David  Epstein  and  Sharyn  O’Halloran,  A Strategic Dominance 
Argument for Retaining Section 5 of the VRA, 5 Election L J 283, 285 (2006) (assuming that situations in which 
Section 2 and Section 5 diverge substantively  are  “relatively  rare”). 
8 Samuel Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of Its Own Success?, 104 Colum L Rev 
1710, 1731 (2004); see also, for example, Bernard Grofman and Thomas Brunell, Extending Section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act: The Complex Interaction Between Law and Politics, in David L. Epstein et al, eds, The Future of the 
Voting Rights Act 311, 321 (Russell 2006); Michael J. Pitts, Let’s  Not  Call  the  Whole  Thing  Off  Just  Yet:  A  
Response  to  Samuel  Issacharoff’s  Suggestion  to Scuttle Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 84 Neb L Rev 605, 627 
(2005)  (“[T]he gap has been significantly narrowed between what amounts to a section 2 violation and what 
amounts  to  a  section  5  violation.”). 
9 Transcript of Oral Argument, Shelby Cty v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612 (No 12-96), *37. 
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scholars  have  dubbed  the  “new  vote  denial.”10 Throughout my examination, I consider the 
statutory text, the case law, and the empirical evidence as  they  stood  at  the  time  of  this  Article’s  
writing. Section 2 and Section 5 operated quite differently in earlier periods, and how they will 
evolve in the future is, of course, unknowable.  
 
 With respect to procedure, there are three key differences between litigation under 
Section 2 and preclearance under Section 5. The burden of proof is on the plaintiff under Section 
2 but on the jurisdiction under Section 5. The default is that a challenged policy goes into effect 
under Section 2 but that it does not under Section 5. And the party that typically invokes the 
VRA’s  protections  is  a  private  plaintiff under Section 2 but the DOJ under Section 5. These 
differences mean that certain policies that formerly would have been blocked by Section 5 now 
will be implemented. Sometimes a plaintiff will be unable to satisfy its burden under Section 2 
even though, on the same facts, a jurisdiction would have been unable to meet its burden under 
Section 5. Sometimes a plaintiff will be able to satisfy its Section 2 burden, but only after a 
contested policy has come into force for some time. And sometimes private parties will want to 
challenge particular electoral practices, but will be unable to do so because of limited resources. 
 
 How many policies will take effect as a consequence of these procedural distinctions? It 
is impossible to know for certain, but the available empirical evidence suggests that the number 
will be substantial. First, the success rate of Section 2 litigation in areas formerly covered by 
Section 5 has hovered around 40 percent over the last generation.11 Plaintiffs therefore are likely 
to lose many of their lawsuits against practices that previously would have been denied 
preclearance. Second, the proportion of Section 2 suits in which preliminary injunctions are 
granted is quite small, certainly no higher than 25 percent and probably lower than 5 percent.12 
Many policies thus are likely to go into effect temporarily even if they ultimately are invalidated 
in Section 2 litigation. And third, the volume of Section 5 preclearance denials has been about 
the same, over the past few decades, as the volume of Section 2 suits in covered areas.13 
Accordingly, private parties would need a significant infusion of resources in order to dispute all 
of the policies that formerly would have been blocked. 
 
 Turning next to vote dilution, there also are three major differences between the electoral 
districts to which Section 2 applies and those protected by Section 5. Section 2 does not extend 
to bizarrely shaped districts while Section 5 does. Section 2 does not encompass districts that 
merge highly dissimilar minority communities while Section 5 again does. And Section 2 does 
not cover districts whose minority voters comprise less than 50 percent of their total population 
while Section 5 does once more. These differences stem from a series of Supreme Court 
decisions narrowing the scope of Section 2, and they mean that certain districts that previously 
were shielded by Section 5 now no longer will enjoy legal protection. Jurisdictions now will 
                                                 
10 See Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting Rights Act, 57 SC 
L Rev 689 (2006) (coining the phrase). 
11 See Ellen Katz et al, Documenting Discrimination in Voting: Judicial Findings Under Section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act Since 1982, 39 U Mich J L Reform 643, 656 (2006). 
12 See J. Gerald Hebert and Armand Defner, More Observations on Shelby County, Alabama and the 
Supreme Court, Campaign Legal Center Blog (Mar 1, 2013), online at 
http://www.clcblog.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=506:more-observations-on-shelby-
county-alabama-and-the-supreme-court-. 
13 See Shelby Cty v Holder, 679 F3d 848, 872 (DC Cir 2012), revd, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013). 
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have the ability to eliminate districts that are shaped too strangely, that have overly 
heterogeneous minority populations, or that have minority populations that are too small, to 
qualify for Section 2 coverage. 
 
 How many districts fall into these categories? To answer this question, I first identified 
all of the districts that used to be protected by Section 5 in the nine southern and southwestern 
states to which the provision formerly applied in large part or in full.14 There are 404 
congressional and state legislative districts that meet these criteria. Of these, twenty-two are so 
non-compact that they likely can be dismantled without violating Section 2. This number is small 
because jurisdictions seem to have learned from the redistricting battles of the 1990s, when the 
Court struck down several strangely shaped districts. But a much larger number of districts, 146 
in total, contain minority populations that are so heterogeneous that Section 2 may not extend to 
them. The role of such heterogeneity in Section 2 doctrine is not yet settled, but if it is a binding 
requirement then minority representation in the South could be slashed in the wake of Shelby 
County. Lastly, only 17 previously covered districts have minority voter proportions below 50 
percent. Here too jurisdictions appear to have taken to heart the lessons of earlier Court 
decisions—and also to have mastered the art of crafting majority-minority districts while 
simultaneously advancing partisan interests. 
 
 Of course, not all of the districts that populate the Section 2 – Section 5 gap will be 
disbanded. When Republicans are responsible for redistricting (as they now are in almost every 
formerly covered state), they often will find it politically beneficial to preserve majority-minority 
districts. Such districts enable them to pack Democrats into a small number of overwhelmingly 
safe constituencies, thus enhancing Republican electoral prospects. Likewise, when Democrats 
are in charge, they often will face intense pressure from minority groups not to eliminate 
minority-controlled districts, even if doing so would help the Democratic cause. But this is not to 
say that the Section 2 – Section 5 gap will not be exploited at all. Republican line-drawers 
sometimes will be able to reap greater political benefits by concentrating minority voters into a 
smaller number of super-packed districts. Analogously, Democratic line-drawers sometimes will 
decide to craft more districts in which minority voters are sufficiently numerous to ensure the 
victory of a Democrat—but not to elect their own preferred candidate. 
 
 Finally, the differences between Section 2 and Section 5 are more uncertain in the vote 
denial context. The franchise restrictions recently enacted by many states are a relatively new 
development, and neither the courts nor the DOJ yet have had time to develop concrete 
standards. Still, it again appears that there is substantive space between the two provisions. 
Under Section 2, plaintiffs typically need to demonstrate not only that a statistical disparity exists 
between minorities and whites, but also that a franchise restriction interacts with social and 
historical conditions to cause the disparity. Under Section 5, on the other hand, a disparate 
impact alone usually suffices to prevent a restriction from going into effect, as long as the burden 
imposed by the restriction on voting is material. 
 
 Because of the small number of cases to which these standards have been applied, the 
magnitude of the relevant Section 2 – Section 5 gap is unclear. But it is revealing that plaintiffs 
                                                 
14 These states are Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Texas, and Virginia. 
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have yet to prevail in a Section 2 challenge to a photo identification law, while three such laws 
were blocked, at least temporarily, under Section 5.15 Similarly, a recent Florida law that reduced 
the  number  of  hours  for  early  voting  was  denied  preclearance  with  respect  to  the  state’s  five  
formerly covered counties, but sustained under Section 2 with respect to the rest of the state.16 If 
there indeed is space between Section 2 and Section 5 in the vote denial context, there is little 
doubt that it quickly will be seized. Unlike in the redistricting context, Republicans’  political 
incentives point unambiguously toward the enactment of additional franchise restrictions. Not 
surprisingly, in the brief period that has elapsed since Shelby County was decided, officials in 
Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia already have announced their 
intention to pass or implement photo ID laws and other similar measures.17 
 
 Assume, then, that there is both a procedural and a substantive gap between Section 2 and 
Section 5. Assume, that is, that minority representation in the South in fact will be adversely 
affected by the nullification of Section 5. What are the implications for Congress and for the 
Court? If these institutions are unconcerned about minority political influence, of course, the 
only upshot is that the new status quo should be maintained. If the institutions are concerned, 
however, there exist several options for narrowing the Section 2 – Section 5 gap. First, as the 
Court observed in Shelby County,  “Congress  may  draft  another  formula  based  on  current  
conditions.”18 Metrics such as the success rate of Section 2 litigation, the prevalence of racially 
polarized voting, and the persistence of racially discriminatory attitudes all would result in most 
of the formerly covered areas once again becoming subject to preclearance. Second, Congress 
could amend Section 3 of the VRA19 to  make  it  easier  to  “bail  in”  jurisdictions  that  have  
committed voting rights violations. Section 3 applies at present only if a constitutional 
transgression has occurred; it could be revised to extend to findings of Section 2 liability as well. 
 
 Last, and most relevant to this Article, Congress could amend Section 2 to make it more 
closely resemble the stricken Section 5. On the procedural side, Congress could increase the 
availability of preliminary injunctions and institute a burden-shifting framework under which the 
onus would switch to the jurisdiction once a plaintiff makes a preliminary showing of harm. 
With respect to vote dilution, Congress  could  expand  the  scope  of  Section  2’s  coverage  so  that  it  
too applies to districts that are strangely shaped or whose minority populations are heterogeneous 
or below 50 percent in size. And with respect to vote denial, Congress could make disparate 
impact alone the standard for Section 2 liability. Moreover, at least on the substantive side, these 
changes also could be made by the Court. It is the Court that has exercised its interpretive 
discretion to limit Section 2 in the past. This same discretion could be used to broaden it in the 
future. 
 
 The Article proceeds as follows. The first three Parts explore the contours of the Section 
2 – Section 5 gap in the contexts of procedure, vote dilution, and vote denial. All three include 
conceptual and empirical assessments of the gap, while the latter two also evaluate the extent to 
                                                 
15 These were a Louisiana law in 1994, a South Carolina law in 2012, and a Texas law in 2012. 
16 Compare Florida v United States, 885 F Supp 2d 299 (DDC 2012) (denying preclearance in five covered 
counties) with Brown v Detzner, 895 F Supp 2d 1236 (MD Fla 2012) (upholding law statewide under Section 2). 
17 See Lizette Alvarez, Ruling Revives Florida Efforts to Police Voters, NY Times A1 (Aug 7, 2013); 
Michael Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws, NY Times A9 (July 6, 2013). 
18 Shelby Cty. v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612, 2631 (2013). 
19 42 USC § 1973a(c). 
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which the gap is likely to be exploited by political actors. The final Part shifts from analysis to 
prescription. It presents a range of actions that Congress and the Court could take to undo the 
effects of Shelby County—to make Section Two minus Section Five once again equal to zero. 
 
I. PROCEDURE 
 
Beginning with procedure, then, the crucial difference between Section 2 and Section 5 is 
that the former authorizes a conventional cause of action while the latter establishes the 
extraordinary institution of preclearance. In this Part I probe the implications of this distinction, 
focusing on the kind and quantity of policies that formerly would have been blocked but that 
now will go into effect. I first explain, as a conceptual matter, why there are likely to be policies 
that fall into the procedural gap between the provisions. Some previously blocked policies now 
will not be challenged; some will be challenged but will be upheld; and some will be struck 
down but only after they temporarily have come into force. I then survey the available empirical 
evidence about the magnitude of the procedural gap. Some rough estimates are that private 
parties would require at least twice their current resources to challenge all of the previously 
blocked policies; that 60 percent of policies that are challenged will be upheld; and that 95 
percent of policies that eventually are stricken still will go into effect temporarily. These figures 
must be taken with a grain of salt, but they suggest that the impact of switching from Section 5 
preclearance to Section 2 litigation will be substantial. 
 
A. Conceptual Differences 
 
In its current form, Section 2 creates a cause of action for parties who believe that an 
electoral  practice  “results  in  a  denial  or  abridgement  of  the  right  .  .  .  to  vote  on  account  of  race  or  
color.”20 The  provision  is  violated  “if,  based  on  the  totality  of  circumstances,  it  is  shown  that”  
members  of  a  protected  racial  or  ethnic  group  “have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate  to  participate  in  the  political  process  and  to  elect  representatives  of  their  choice.”21 In 
contrast, Section 5 bars covered jurisdictions from implementing any changes to their voting 
laws until the changes have been approved by either the DOJ or the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia.22 The DOJ has sixty days to object to a submission, while a three-judge 
panel of the federal court is convened if a jurisdiction chooses the judicial route for 
preclearance.23 Under both the administrative and judicial routes, a jurisdiction must establish 
that  its  amendment  “neither  has  the  purpose  nor  will  have  the  effect  of  denying  or  abridging  the  
right to vote on account of race or color.”24 “Any  discriminatory  purpose”  is  prohibited  by  this  
language,25 as  is  “diminishing  the  ability”  of  members  of  protected  groups  “to  elect  their  
preferred  candidates  of  choice.”26 
                                                 
20 Id § 1973(a). 
21 Id § 1973(b). According to the statute, minority groups’  diminished  opportunity  to  participate  in  the  
political  process  and  to  elect  the  representatives  of  their  choice  is  evidence  that  “the  political  processes  leading  to  
nomination  or  election  .  .  .  are  not  equally  open  to  participation”  by  the  groups’  members. Id. 
22 See id § 1973c(a). 
23 See id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id § 1973c(c). 
26 Id § 1973c(b); see also id §  1973c(d)  (“The  purpose  of  subsection  (b)  of  this  section  is  to  protect  the  
ability  of  such  citizens  to  elect  their  preferred  candidates  of  choice.”). 
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The first important difference between Section 2 litigation and Section 5 preclearance is 
the allocation of the burden of proof. Under Section 2—as under most causes of action—“the  
initial  burden  of  proving  [a  policy’s]  invalidity [is]  squarely  on  the  plaintiff’s  shoulders.”27 If the 
plaintiff cannot satisfy its burden, with respect to each statutory element, then the challenged 
policy comes into (or remains in) force. Under  Section  5,  on  the  other  hand,  “a  jurisdiction  
seeking . . . preclearance must prove that the change is nondiscriminatory in purpose and 
effect.”28 If the jurisdiction cannot meet its burden, as to both purpose and effect, then its 
proposed policy cannot be implemented. 
 
 Sometimes the allocation of the burden is immaterial. When the illegality of a policy is 
sufficiently clear, a plaintiff can satisfy its burden under Section 2 and a jurisdiction cannot meet 
its burden under Section 5. Likewise, when the lawfulness of a policy is evident enough, a 
plaintiff cannot satisfy its burden under Section 2 and a jurisdiction can meet its burden under 
Section 5. But sometimes the allocation of the burden is dispositive. There necessarily exist 
circumstances in which a plaintiff is unable to satisfy its burden under Section 2 and, on the same 
facts, a jurisdiction is unable to meet its burden under Section 5. In these close cases, a policy 
takes effect if it is the subject of Section 2 litigation, but is blocked if it is the subject of Section 5 
preclearance.29 
 
 A second procedural difference between Section 2 and Section 5 is that, under the former, 
a policy typically remains in force while it is being challenged, while under the latter, a policy 
never goes into effect until it has been precleared.30 The provisions have opposite defaults, in 
other words, during the period before a decision on the merits has been reached. This distinction 
means that, under Section 2, a policy that eventually is declared unlawful still may be 
implemented for one or more election cycles, causing harm to minorities in the meantime.31 
Under Section 5, in contrast, a policy that is denied preclearance never may be put into 
operation, not even for a single election. 
 
 However, this difference between the provisions dissolves whenever a Section 2 plaintiff 
manages to secure a preliminary injunction. In this case, as in a preclearance proceeding, a policy 
does not go into effect until it explicitly has been deemed lawful. Of course, preliminary 
injunctive relief is not easy to obtain, requiring, at an early stage of the litigation, a judicial 
                                                 
27 Voinovich v Quilter, 507 US 146, 155 (1993); see also 42  USC  §  1973(b)  (provision  violated  only  “if  .  .  .  
it is shown”  that  substantive  standards  have  been  satisfied  (emphasis  added));;  S Rep No 97-417, at 27 (1982). 
28 Branch v Smith, 538 US 254, 263 (2003); see also Georgia v United States, 411 US 526, 538 (1973); 
Procedures for the Administration of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as Amended [hereinafter DOJ 
Procedures], 28 CFR §  51.52(a)  (“The burden of proof is on a submitting authority .  .  .  .”). 
29 See Epstein  and  O’Halloran,  5 Election L J at 284-85 (cited in note 7) (observing that there exist 
“proposals  whose  effects  are  unclear,  so  that  they  would  be  struck  down  under  Section  5,  but  survive  under  Section  
2”). 
30 See 42  USC  §  1973c(a)  (“[U]nless  and  until  [preclearance  is  granted]  no  person  shall  be  denied  the  right  
to  vote  for  failure  to  comply  with  such  qualification,  prerequisite,  standard,  practice,  or  procedure.”). 
31 See Shelby Cty v Holder, 679 F3d 848, 872 (DC Cir 2012), revd, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013)  (“[D]uring the 
time it takes to litigate a section 2 action . . . proponents of a discriminatory law may enjoy its benefits, potentially 
winning elections and gaining the advantage of incumbency before the law is overturned.”). 
8 
 
finding that  a  plaintiff’s  claim  is  likely  to  succeed.32 But it is an available remedy, and when it is 
granted, Section 2 and Section 5 partially converge. 
 
 The final procedural differences between the provisions relate to the magnitude and 
allocation of the proceedings’ costs.33 Litigation under Section 2 is more expensive than 
administrative preclearance under Section 5. Section 2 plaintiffs must go through some or all of a 
lawsuit’s  familiar  phases—discovery, summary judgment, trial, appeal, etc.—while jurisdictions 
covered by Section 5 need only submit a standardized set of forms to the DOJ.34 Moreover, 
private parties are the usual plaintiffs in Section 2 litigation, while the DOJ is the key institution 
involved in Section 5 preclearance.35 Private parties thus incur much of the cost of litigation 
under Section 2, while the DOJ shoulders much of the expense of preclearance under Section 5.  
 
 The upshot of these differences is that  a  proceeding’s  cost  rises  when  it  takes place under 
Section 2 rather than Section 5, and a larger proportion of this higher cost is borne by private 
parties. Now that preclearance is unavailable, then, private parties would require additional 
resources in order to challenge under Section 2 all of the policies that formerly would have been 
blocked under Section 5. If these resources are not forthcoming, then private parties will not be 
able to contest the full set of policies that previously would have been denied approval. They will 
need to pick and choose their battles, letting slide some number of policies that they believe (and 
the DOJ would have agreed) are discriminatory. 
 
  But some caveats must be appended to this analysis. First, administrative preclearance 
may be inexpensive, but judicial preclearance, which a covered jurisdiction always has the 
option to request,36 is not. Full-dress litigation under Section 5 is similar in scope and complexity 
to a lawsuit under Section 2. Second, while private parties are the most common plaintiffs in 
Section 2 actions, the DOJ also has the authority to bring suit (and to intervene in existing suits) 
under the provision.37 Now that the DOJ no longer can block policies using Section 5, it can be 
expected to shift some of its resources to litigating Section 2 claims. Third, while the DOJ 
always was the indispensable institution under Section 5, private parties played an important role 
in preclearance proceedings as well. They commonly advised the DOJ in the administrative 
context and intervened in suits in the judicial context—both costs that no longer will be incurred 
after Shelby County. Lastly, private parties are entitled to the reimbursement of attorney and 
expert fees when they prevail in Section 2 suits.38 Thus, in successful cases, the ultimate cost of 
such suits is not necessarily exorbitant (at least not to the plaintiffs). 
 
                                                 
32 See Winter v NRDC, Inc, 555 US 7, 20 (2008). To issue a preliminary injunction, a court also must find 
that the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of relief, that the balance of equities is in the 
plaintiff’s  favor,  and that an injunction is in the public interest. See id. 
33 One additional procedural difference is that Section 5 requires jurisdictions to notify the DOJ of each 
electoral change that they wish to make. Section 2 has no comparable disclosure requirement, meaning that 
sometimes private parties will not know about a policy that they would have challenged had they learned about it. 
34 See DOJ Procedures, 28 CFR §§ 5120-28 (detailing procedures for preclearance submission as well as 
requisite content). 
35 Of course, the jurisdictions whose policies are at issue are the same in either proceeding. 
36 See 42 USC § 1973c(a). 
37 See, for example, United States v Blaine Cty, 363 F3d 897 (9th Cir 2004) (Section 2 action brought by 
DOJ); Brown v Bd of  School  Comm’rs, 706 F2d 1103 (11th Cir 1983) (Section 2 action in which DOJ intervened). 
38 See 42 USC § 1973l(e). 
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 One more caveat should be mentioned with respect to this entire Part. In discussing the 
procedural differences between Section 2 and Section 5, I implicitly am controlling for their 
differences in substance. Their substantive distinctions are addressed at length in the following 
two Parts, but here I am interested in investigating whether (and how large) a space exists 
between the provisions even if Section 2 vote dilution or denial is identical to Section 5 
retrogression. Having identified the conceptual contrasts between the two kinds of proceedings, 
then, I turn next to the empirical evidence about the magnitude of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap. 
 
B. Empirical Gap 
 
The empirical evidence, it must be conceded at the outset, is quite limited. Section 5 was 
in force alongside Section 2 until Shelby County was decided, so it is difficult to determine from 
historical data how many policies that were blocked by Section 5 would have gone into effect 
had only Section 2 been available to challenge them. The deterrent effect of Section 5—how 
many policies never were proposed at all because  of  the  provision’s  existence—is even harder to 
quantify. Still, a wealth of information exists about the operation of Section 2 and Section 5 over 
the years, and it is possible to draw several inferences from this material about the size of the gap 
between the provisions. It also is possible to reach some tentative conclusions from the 
experiences of jurisdictions that were bailed in under Section 3 but that later were released from 
their preclearance obligations. 
 
 To begin with, a study by Ellen Katz found (and other studies later confirmed) that the 
success rate of Section 2 lawsuits in formerly covered jurisdictions was approximately 40 
percent between 1982 and 2005.39 This figure suggests that when private parties challenge 
policies that in the past would have been blocked by Section 5, they will lose a good deal of the 
time. The figure suggests, in other words, that Section  2’s  allocation  of  the  burden  to  the  plaintiff  
rather than the jurisdiction will be dispositive in a substantial number of cases. Of course, the 
policies that in the past would have been blocked by Section 5 may differ in important respects 
from the policies that were analyzed in the retrospective Section 2 studies. In particular, the 
former policies may be more clearly discriminatory than the latter, in which case the success rate 
for plaintiffs challenging the former may be higher than 40 percent. Still, it seems unlikely that 
this figure will approach 100 percent, meaning that Section  2’s  burden  allocation  will  be  decisive  
with some frequency.40 
                                                 
39 See Shelby Cty v Holder, 679 F3d 848, 875 (DC Cir 2012), revd, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013) (citing 40.5 
percent figure); Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act, 108 Colum L Rev 1, 54 appendix 
1 (2008) (citing 39.4 percent figure); Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at 656 (cited in note 11) (citing 42.5 percent 
figure). The success rate was slightly higher, 45.9 percent, for challenges to changes in electoral practices—which 
are, of course, the only policies that can be blocked by Section 5. See Ellen Katz, Not Like the South? Regional 
Variation and Political Participation Through the Lens of Section 2, in Asa Henderson, ed, Voting Rights Act 
Reauthorization of 2006: Perspectives on Democracy, Participation, and Power 183, 221 table 8.6 (Berkeley 2007) 
[hereinafter VRA Reauthorization]. The success rate also has been declining over time. See Cox and Miles, 108 
Colum L Rev at 5, 14 (cited in note 39); Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at 656 (cited in note 11). And the success 
rate in non-covered jurisdictions, 32.2 percent, was lower than in covered jurisdictions despite the unavailability of 
Section 5 in the former areas.  See Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at 656 (cited in note 11). 
40 An additional caveat is that the 40 percent figure stems from Section 2 suits that gave rise to published 
decisions. See Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at 652 (cited in note 11). I am not aware of any data on the success 
rate of Section 2 suits that did not generate published decisions. However, former DOJ voting rights attorney (and 
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 Next, estimates vary as to how often preliminary injunctions are granted in Section 2 
cases, but consistently are quite low. At the Shelby County oral argument, Solicitor General 
Donald Verrilli  stated  that  such  relief  is  obtained  in  “fewer  than  one-quarter of ultimately 
successful  Section  2  suits.”41 Veteran Section 2 litigators Armand Defner and Gerry Hebert put 
the  proportion  at  “less  than  5%,  and  possibly  quite  lower.”42 And former DOJ official Robert 
Kengle  recently  testified  that  “the total number of such cases since 1982 is in the range of 10 to 
15.”43 Whatever the exact figure may be, the implication is that preliminary injunctions rarely 
alter the Section 2 default during the period before a decision on the merits is reached. Most of 
the time, policies that never previously would have gone into effect due to Section 5 now will 
come into force upon enactment—even if they ultimately are struck down. The nominal 
availability of preliminary relief does not appreciably shrink the Section 2 – Section 5 gap.44 
 
 Nor is the gap mitigated by the pace of Section 2 litigation. According to testimony by 
longtime  civil  rights  attorney  Anita  Earls,  it  takes  “at  least  two  years”  to  advance  a  Section  2  
action from  filing  to  trial,  and  “[t]wo  to  five  years  is  a  rough  average”  of a  suit’s  duration.45 This 
period typically is long enough to encompass at least one and possibly multiple election cycles. It 
indicates that the absence of preliminary relief in most Section 2 cases will have real bite. 
Litigation will not move quickly enough to produce a decision on the merits before a policy that 
eventually is invalidated has harmed minorities for an election or two (and allowed incumbents 
to entrench themselves in office).46 
 
 Of course, the burden of proof and the availability of preliminary relief matter only if 
Section 2 litigation actually has commenced. But such litigation may not commence if private 
parties lack the resources to challenge policies that formerly would have been denied 
preclearance. Defner and Hebert have estimated that  a  Section  2  districting  case  “requires a 
                                                 
current law professor) Michael Pitts informs me that the latter rate almost certainly is higher because it would 
include the many consent decrees approved as a result of Section 2 litigation.  
41 Transcript of Oral Argument, Shelby Cty v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612 (No 12-96), *38. 
42 Hebert and Defner, More Observations on Shelby County, Alabama and the Supreme Court (cited in note 
12). 
43 Testimony of Robert A. Kengle Before the House Judiciary Committee 11 (July 18, 2013) (emphasis 
added). The reasons why preliminary relief rarely is granted in Section 2 cases include the difficulty of amassing 
sufficient evidence at an early stage in the litigation, see Testimony of Prof Justin Levitt Before the US Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary 8 (July 17, 2013) [hereinafter Levitt Testimony], and the aversion of many courts to 
enjoining elections if alternate remedies can be imposed in the future, see, for example, Williams v Dallas, 734 F 
Supp 1317, 1367 (ND Tex 1990). 
44 Though it should be noted again that the policies that formerly would have been blocked by Section 5 
may differ materially from the policies that until now have given rise to Section 2 litigation. It is possible that 
preliminary injunctions will be granted with greater frequency when the former policies are challenged under 
Section 2. 
45 Testimony of Anita Earls Before the House Judiciary Committee 63-64 (Oct 25, 2005); see also Brief of 
Joaquin Avila et al as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 22, Shelby Cty v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612 (No 12-96) 
[hereinafter Avila Brief]. 
46 It may be the case, as Michael Carvin has testified, that Section 2 and Section 5 give rise to equally 
lengthy litigation in complicated redistricting cases. See Testimony of Michael A. Carvin Before the US Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary 7 (July 17, 2013). But during the pendency of the litigation, the district plan typically 
goes into effect under Section 2 but does not under Section 5. 
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minimum of hundreds of thousands of dollars,”47 while  Hebert  separately  has  testified  that  “the 
cost . . . to bring a vote dilution case through trial and appeal[] runs close to a half a million 
dollars.”48 Similarly, in a 2005 study, the Federal Judicial Center found that voting rights suits 
entail 3.86 times more work than the median federal action, and rank sixth in intensity out of 
sixty-three case categories.49 The unusual cost and complexity of Section 2 suits mean that 
private parties will not be able to bring them against all of the policies that previously were 
blocked by Section 5. As  a  group  of  Section  2  litigators  has  written,  “The voting rights bar lacks 
the numbers and resources . . . to prosecute the . . . Section 2 lawsuits that would be necessary to 
block all the discriminatory changes that would be implemented without Section 5.”50 
 
 What resources would the voting rights bar need to pursue all of these cases? One way to 
answer this question (albeit imprecisely) is to compare the volume of Section 2 and Section 5 
activity in recent years. Under Section 2, then, there were 653 successful suits51 in formerly 
covered jurisdictions between 1982 and 2005, resulting in 160 published decisions.52 The total 
number of such suits is unknown, but has been estimated conservatively to be at least 800.53 
Under Section 5, over the same period, there were 626 preclearance denials by the DOJ and 25 
preclearance denials by the courts.54 Another 800 proposed policies were withdrawn or modified 
after the DOJ requested additional information about them.55 Accordingly, the ratio of Section 2 
to Section 5 activity in the South was between 1:1 and 1:2 over the last generation. Private 
parties would have had to have launched double to triple their actual number of Section 2 suits in 
order to have challenged all of the policies that were blocked by Section 5. This larger volume of 
                                                 
47 J. Gerald Hebert and Armand Defner, Shelby County, Alabama and the Supreme Court, Campaign Legal 
Center Blog (Feb 28, 2013), online at 
http://www.clcblog.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=505:shelby-county-alabama-and-the-
supreme-court.  
48 Avila Brief at 25 (cited in note 45); see also Levitt Testimony at 9 (cited in note 43) (reporting  plaintiffs’  
fees and costs of $712,027.71 in a representative Section 2 case). In contrast, administrative preclearance usually 
costs between $1,000 and $5,000 for a major change, and between $500 and $1,000 for a minor one. See Avila Brief 
at 26 (cited in note 45); see also National Committee on the Voting Rights Act, Protecting Minority Voters: The 
Voting Rights Act at Work 1982-2005, at 55-56 (2006) [hereinafter Protecting Minority Voters] (noting much greater 
cost of Section 2 suit challenging at-large voting scheme for Charleston county council than Section 5 preclearance 
denial of identical policy proposal by Charleston county school board). 
49 Fed Judicial Ctr, 2003-2004 District Court Case-Weighting Study 5-6 table 1 (2005); see also Shelby Cty 
v Holder, 679 F3d 848, 872 (DC Cir 2012), revd, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013) (citing this study); United States v Blaine 
Cty,  363  F3d  897,  906  (9th  Cir  2004)  (“[S]ection  2  cases  are  some  of  the  most  difficult  to  litigate  .  .  .  .”). 
50 Avila Brief at 3 (cited in note 45); see also id at 29 (noting that major civil rights groups such as the 
NAACP  and  the  Lawyers’  Committee  for  Civil  Rights  have  only  a  handful  of  attorneys  dedicated  to  voting  rights).  
51 See Shelby Cty, 679 F3d at 868, 872; Protecting Minority Voters at 88 (cited in note 48). 
52 See Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at 656 (cited in note 11). 
53 See id at 655. A single group, the ACLU Voting Rights Project, brought several hundred of these actions. 
See ACLU, The Case for Extending and Amending the Voting Rights Act 4 (2006). 
54 See Shelby Cty, 679 F3d at 866, 870-72; see also Luis Ricardo Fraga and Maria Lizet Ocampo, More 
Information Requests and the Deterrent Effect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in Henderson, ed, VRA 
Reauthorization 47, 49 (cited in note 39) (finding that DOJ preclearance denials prevented 2,282 individual changes 
from taking effect).  
55 See Shelby Cty, 679 F3d at 866, 872; Fraga and Ocampo, More Information Requests and the Deterrent 
Effect of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act at 58 table 3.1 (cited in note 54) (identifying 854 such policies). 
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litigation would have required double to triple the resources as well (assuming that the 
hypothetical suits would have been similar in cost to the actual suits).56 
 
 But recall from the above discussion that the DOJ also will be able to shoulder some of 
the heavier Section 2 burden in the wake of Shelby County.57 Unfortunately,  the  DOJ’s  capacity  
to bring Section 2 suits is relatively limited. Its Voting Rights Section includes a range of 
demographers, historians, and other analysts who formerly worked on Section 5 matters—but 
“comparatively  few  attorneys”  who  now  could  turn  their attention to Section 2.58 Notably, the 
Section filed only eighteen Section 2 cases during the eight years of the Bush administration, and 
has initiated just four cases under the Obama administration (through 2012).59 These numbers 
undoubtedly will rise as the Section shifts its focus from Section 5 to Section 2, but, as Justin 
Levitt  has  observed,  “‘The  Nation’s  Litigator’ should not be expected to meet all of the new need 
. . . at least given staffing at the current order of magnitude.”60  
 
 Since the DOJ will be unable to play the role of deus ex machina, private parties will 
need to make difficult choices as to which policies they will challenge (barring a large infusion 
of resources). The policies they seem least apt to contest are ones promulgated by local 
governments. In recent years, local practices accounted for more than 90 percent of preclearance 
denials under Section 5,61 but only about 70 percent of Section 2 litigation.62 Suits against local 
governments also are especially vulnerable to “[t]he unavailability of experienced voting rights 
attorneys and of sufficient financial resources,”  according  to  longtime  Section  2  litigators.63 
High-profile statewide laws, such as district plans and franchise restrictions, thus are likely to be 
the target of future Section 2 litigation. The Section 2 – Section 5 gap probably will be largest 
with respect to less salient local election law changes. 
 
 The final evidence about the size of the gap stems from the experiences of the two states, 
Arkansas and New Mexico, that have been bailed in under Section 3 of the VRA. Section 3 
authorizes  courts  to  impose  a  preclearance  requirement  almost  identical  to  Section  5’s  on 
                                                 
56 If Section 5 had a significant deterrent effect in the past, then jurisdictions now may be expected to enact 
more policies that formerly would have been denied preclearance. In this case, private parties would need even more 
resources to challenge under Section 2 all of the policies that previously would have been blocked. In terms of actual 
dollar figures, there were approximately sixty policies per year that were blocked by Section 5 over the 1982-2005 
period. If each of these policies would have cost about $500,000 to litigate under Section 2, then the total price tag 
for challenging the policies under Section 2 rather than under Section 5 would have been roughly $30 million per 
year. 
57 See note 37 and accompanying text. 
58 Levitt Testimony at 11 (cited in note 43); see also Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the 
Operations of the Voting Section of the Civil Rights Division 9 (2013) [hereinafter Inspector General Report] (noting 
that number of attorneys in Voting Section has varied between thirty-one and forty-five in recent years).  
59 See Inspector General Report at 24 (cited in note 58). Former DOJ voting rights attorney John Tanner 
also informs me that since 1976 the DOJ has launched only 112 Section 2 cases, or approximately three per year. 
60 Levitt Testimony at 11. 
61 See Shelby Cty v Holder, 679 F3d 848, 872 (DC Cir 2012), revd, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013); Pitts, 84 Neb L 
Revat 612-13 (cited in note 8). 
62 See Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L Rev at 54 appendix 1 (cited in note 39); Pitts, 84 Neb L Rev at 616 
(cited  in  note  8)  (“[S]ection  2  cases are much less likely to be filed when it comes to redistricting in smaller 
jurisdictions  .  .  .  .”). 
63 Avila Brief at 28 (cited in note 45); see also Shelby Cty, 679 F3d at 872 (noting that difficulty of bringing 
Section  2  claim  is  greatest  “at  the  local  level  and  in  rural  communities”). 
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jurisdictions that are found to have violated the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments.64 The 
provision has been used only twice to bail in states, both times for the 1990 redistricting cycle.65 
In both Arkansas and New Mexico, then, the Section 2 litigation in the 1980s that led to the 
imposition of preclearance was much costlier and lengthier than the proceedings in the following 
decade. In Arkansas, the Jeffers suit in the 1980s necessitated a trial66 and resulted in the creation 
of eight new majority-minority districts,67 while  the  state’s  district plans in the 1990s were 
precleared by the court with relatively little fuss.68 Analogously, in New Mexico, the Sanchez 
suit in the 1980s led to sixteen districts being invalidated, primary elections being nullified, and 
federal examiners being deployed,69 while  the  state’s  plans in the 1990s were precleared by the 
DOJ within four months.70 This history confirms the much greater expense and complexity of 
Section 2 litigation relative to preclearance.71 
 
 Arkansas’s  experiences since the 1990 redistricting cycle—i.e., after it was released from 
its preclearance obligations—also are illuminating. None  of  the  state’s  district  plans  in  the  2000s  
was challenged under Section 2, suggesting either that private parties lacked the resources to 
dispute them or that they were compliant with the VRA.72 In the 2010s, private parties did bring 
a  Section  2  action  against  Arkansas’s  state  senate  plan,  alleging  that  one  of  its  districts  was  “not  
an effective majority-minority  district.”73 The court rejected this claim even though it seemed to 
concede  that  the  district  did  not  “provide  minority  voters  .  .  .  with  the  ability  to  elect  candidates  
of  their  choice.”74 The court rejected the claim, that is, while apparently admitting that the state 
senate plan was retrogressive and thus would have violated Section 5. Also of note, private 
parties  did  not  challenge  Arkansas’s  2010s state house plan even though it reduced by one the 
number of majority-minority districts.75 This plan likely would have been denied preclearance 
too, but it escaped  judicial  review  altogether  thanks  to  the  expiration  of  the  state’s  Section  3  
coverage. 
                                                 
64 See 42 USC § 1973a(c). 
65 See Jeffers v Clinton, 740 F Supp 585, 601-02 (ED Ark. 1990) (invoking Section 3 for preclearance of 
majority-vote  provisions  and  court’s  own  equitable  power  for  preclearance  of  district  plans);;  Sanchez v Anaya, No 
82-0067M (DNM Dec 17, 1984) (consent decree).  
66 See Jeffers v Clinton, 730 F Supp 196 (ED Ark 1989). 
67 See Jeffers v Tucker, 847 F Supp 655, 657 (ED Ark 1994).  
68 See id (noting that certain plaintiffs settled with state and upholding state’s  plan). 
69 See New Mexico Legislative Council Service, A Guide to State and Congressional Redistricting in New 
Mexico 10-11 (2001). 
70 See id at 11-12. The DOJ objected to the original state senate plan, but within five weeks the legislature 
had passed, and the DOJ had approved, a new plan. See id. 
71 Though the 1980 redistricting cycle also may have been especially laborious for Arkansas and New 
Mexico  because  the  critical  1982  amendments  to  Section  2  were  passed  after  the  states’  districts  already  had been 
drawn. Less costly and lengthy litigation might have ensued had the states known in advance about the legal 
standard with which they later were forced to comply. 
72 See 2000s Redistricting Case Summaries, Nat’l  Conf  of  State  Legislatures (last visited Oct. 1, 2013), 
online at http://www.senate.mn/departments/scr/redist/redsum2000/redsum2000.htm [hereinafter 2000s Case 
Summaries]. The latter explanation is more likely since the numbers of majority-minority  districts  in  Arkansas’s  
state legislative plans did not decrease between the 1990s and the 2000s. 
73 Jeffers v Beebe, 895 F Supp 2d 920, 929 (ED Ark 2012). The district in question had a black voting-age 
population  of  52.8  percent,  which  according  to  the  plaintiffs’  expert  was  insufficient  to  provide  African  Americans  
with an equal opportunity to elect their preferred candidate. See id at 932-33. 
74 Id at 933. 
75 The  data  on  the  composition  of  Arkansas’s  state  legislative  districts  is  on  file  with  the  author. 
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 Unfortunately for present purposes,  New  Mexico’s  elected  branches  deadlocked  in  both  
the 2000s and the 2010s, forcing courts to design all  of  the  state’s  districts.76 While Section 2 
supplied one of the principles on the basis of which the districts were shaped, it makes little 
sense to probe the Section 2 – Section 5 gap when courts, not political actors, are the line-
drawers. Arkansas’s  recent history also is suggestive but hardly conclusive; in particular, in the 
absence of an actual denial of preclearance, it is very difficult to determine whether a district 
plan in fact is retrogressive. Still, this Section 3 analysis is consistent with all of the other 
empirical evidence presented in this Section about the procedural space between Section 2 and 
Section 5. If anything, the Section 3 findings are especially compelling because they alone are 
based on the experiences of jurisdictions that were subjected to—but then released from—
preclearance. 
 
II. VOTE DILUTION 
 
It is no surprise that the Arkansas and New Mexico cases both involved claims of vote 
dilution arising from redistricting. While the VRA prohibits both vote dilution and vote denial, 
the former has accounted for the vast majority of activity under both Section 2 and Section 5.77 It 
therefore is the first substantive area to which I turn (and the area to which I devote more 
attention). I begin by describing the differences between the districts to which Section 2 applies 
and those protected by Section 5. Thanks to a series of narrowing interpretations by the Supreme 
Court, Section 2 does not extend to districts that are bizarrely shaped or whose minority 
populations are highly heterogeneous or below 50 percent in size. Section 5, in contrast, likely 
shields districts with all of these characteristics. 
 
Next, I use a range of empirical techniques to estimate the number of existing districts 
that formerly were protected by Section 5 but now are beyond the scope of Section 2. No such 
analysis yet has been conducted even though it is vital to determining the practical impact of 
Shelby County. According to my calculations, only a handful of current districts are so non-
compact, or have minority populations that are so small, that they are uncovered by Section 2. 
However, many more current districts contain sufficiently heterogeneous minority populations 
that they now may be dismantled without running afoul of the provision.  
 
Lastly, I assess the likelihood, as a political matter, that the districts that populate the 
Section 2 – Section 5 gap will be eliminated. Both parties often will have strong incentives to 
preserve these districts, Republicans because of partisan advantage and Democrats due to 
pressure from minority groups. But both parties sometimes will find it beneficial to jettison 
previously insulated districts. Republicans may be able to win a larger proportion of seats by 
                                                 
76 See 2000s Case Summaries (cited in note 72); Justin Levitt, Litigation in the 2010 Cycle – New Mexico, 
All About Redistricting (last visited Oct 1, 2013), online at http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases-NM.php#NM. 
77 See Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L Rev at  11  (cited  in  note  39)  (noting  that  Section  2  cases  are  “dominated 
by decisions involving challenges to at-large elections . . . and challenges to reapportionment plans”);;  Katz et al, 39 
U Mich J L Reform at 656 (cited in note 11) (same); Peyton McCrary et al, The Law of Preclearance: Enforcing 
Section 5, in Epstein et al, eds, The Future of the Voting Rights Act 20, 25 (cited in note 8); Rick Pildes and Dan 
Tokaji, What Did VRA Preclearance Actually Do?: The Gap Between Perception and Reality, Election Law Blog 
(Aug 19, 2013), online at http://electionlawblog.org/?p=54521 (“Redistricting  changes  generated  vastly  more 
objections  [under  Section  5]  than  any  other  category  .  .  .  .”). 
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concentrating minorities into a smaller number of super-packed districts. And Democrats may be 
able to optimize their electoral position by spreading minorities more evenly across a district 
map. 
 
A. Conceptual Differences 
 
In its first decision interpreting the current text of Section 2, Thornburg v Gingles,78 the 
Supreme Court set forth the doctrinal standard for claims of vote dilution arising from 
redistricting. Initially, a minority group must comply with three preconditions: (1) it must be 
“sufficiently  large  and  geographically  compact  to  constitute  a  majority in a single-member 
district”;;  (2)  it  must  be  “politically  cohesive”;;  and  (3)  “the  white majority [must] vote[] 
sufficiently  as  a  bloc  to  enable  it  .  .  .  usually  to  defeat  the  minority’s  preferred  candidate.”79 If 
these threshold criteria are satisfied, a court proceeds to an analysis of the totality of the 
circumstances. The most important elements of this analysis are the nine factors identified by the 
Senate  report  that  accompanied  Congress’s  amendments  to  Section  2  in  1982,80 as well as the 
proportionality  of  a  minority  group’s  existing  representation.81 In order to prevail, a group also 
must show that there exists a suitable benchmark with which the challenged policy may be 
compared.82 A group must show as well that at least one additional district could be created in 
which the group would be able to elect the candidate of its choice.83 
 
 Section 5, in contrast, almost never requires additional minority-ability (i.e.,  “ability”84) 
districts to be drawn.85 Rather, the provision prohibits any worsening of the electoral position of 
minorities, that is, retrogression.86 Retrogression is determined by examining a district plan in its 
entirety, not by assessing individual districts in isolation.87 A plan is deemed retrogressive if it 
reduces, relative to the plan previously in effect, the total number of districts in which minorities 
                                                 
78 478 US 30 (1986); see also Growe v Emison, 507 US 25, 40-41 (1993) (applying the Gingles framework 
to single-member districts). 
79 Thornburg, 478 US at 50-51. 
80 See id at 36-37, 44-45. These factors include any history of official discrimination, the extent of racial 
polarization in voting, the use of election rules that overly advantage the majority, access to the candidate slating 
process, the impact of discrimination on  minorities’  political  participation,  the  use  of  racial  appeals  in  campaigns,  
minorities’  prior  success  in  winning  office,  elected  officials’  responsiveness  to  minority  concerns,  and  the  
tenuousness  of  a  jurisdiction’s  justification  for  a  policy.  See id. 
81 See Johnson v De Grandy, 512 US 997, 1000 (1994). 
82 See Holder v Hall, 512 US 874, 880 (1994). 
83 See LULAC v Perry, 548 US 399, 437 (2006); Johnson,  512  US  at  1008  (“[T]he first Gingles condition 
requires the possibility of creating more than the existing number of [minority-opportunity  districts]  .  .  .  .”). 
84 For  the  sake  of  simplicity,  I  use  the  term  “ability  districts”  to  refer  to  districts  covered  by  both  Section  2  
and Section 5. But the  term  “opportunity  districts”  technically  is  more  accurate  for  Section  2-covered districts since 
the  provision  refers  to  the  “opportunity”  rather  than  the  “ability”  to  elect. 
85 The only exceptions are if the failure to draw additional ability districts establishes discriminatory intent 
or if a jurisdiction must draw a larger number of districts (due to population growth, for example). See Texas v 
United States, 887 F Supp 2d 133, 156-59 (DDC 2012), vacd, 133 S Ct 2885 (2013) (Texas II); see also note 129 
(describing earlier period in which DOJ treated Section 2 violations as grounds for denying preclearance).  
86 See Beer v United States, 425 US 130, 141 (1976). 
87 See Georgia v Ashcroft, 539 US 461, 479 (2003). 
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are able to elect the candidate of their choice.88 A plan also is unlawful under Section 5 if it is 
motivated by any kind of discriminatory intent.89 
  
 At first blush, Section 2 and Section 5 would seem to have very similar coverage with 
respect to the elimination of an existing ability district. Under Section 2, a minority group easily 
would be able to show that an additional such district could be drawn because an additional such 
district existed before it was dismantled. Likewise, under Section 5, the erasure of a district in 
which minorities previously were able to elect their preferred candidate is the very definition of 
retrogression. The statutory text confirms the apparent overlap of the two provisions. Section 2 
forbids  district  plans  that  give  minority  members  “less  opportunity  .  .  .  to  elect  representatives  of  
their  choice,”90 while  Section  5  bans  plans  that  “diminish[]  the  ability”  of  minorities  “to  elect  
their preferred candidates  of  choice.”91 It would take no interpretive gymnastics to construe these 
passages identically. 
 
 But this is not the path the Court has taken. Instead, in a series of decisions spanning two 
decades, the Court repeatedly has narrowed the scope of Section 2. A clear substantive gap now 
exists  between  Section  2  and  Section  5,  even  though  neither  the  provisions’  language  nor  their  
logic requires that there be such a gap. Below I lay out the three principal ways in which Section 
2 and Section 5 diverge in their coverage. These distinctions have not previously been identified, 
but together they mean that certain districts that used to be shielded by Section 5 now will be 
bereft of any legal protection. 
 
1. Geographic Compactness 
 
 First, in a line of cases in the 1990s involving allegations that districts were 
unconstitutional racial gerrymanders, the Court held that highly non-compact districts are never 
required by Section 2. If minority members are geographically distributed in such a way that 
only a bizarre-looking district can enclose enough of them to enable the election of their 
preferred candidate, then there is no liability under the provision. Even if minorities reside in a 
manner that permits a reasonably compact ability district to be drawn (in which case there is 
liability), it is an impermissible remedy to create a district that is too strangely shaped.92 The 
Court thus declared that a district that tracked highway I-85  through  North  Carolina  “could  not  
remedy  any  potential  §  2  violation.”93 “No one looking at [the district] could reasonably suggest 
                                                 
88 See Texas v United States, 831 F Supp 2d 244, 262 (DDC 2011) (Texas I) (noting that Section 5 inquiry 
“requires identifying districts in which minority citizens enjoy an existing ability to elect and comparing the number 
of such districts in the benchmark to the number of such districts in a proposed plan”).  Under  the  approach  adopted  
by the Supreme Court in Georgia, but rejected by Congress in its 2006 amendments, the retrogression inquiry also 
would have required consideration of the number of minority influence districts, the ability of minorities to 
participate  in  the  political  process,  and  minorities’  legislative  power.  See Georgia, 539 US at 479-85. 
89 See Texas II, 887 F Supp 2d at 151-52. Prior to its 2006 amendments, Section 5 had been interpreted to 
prohibit only retrogressive intent. See Reno v Bossier Parish Sch Bd, 528 US 320, 328 (2000). 
90 42 USC § 1973(b). 
91 Id § 1973c(b). 
92 See Bush v Vera, 517 US 952, 979 (1996)  (“If,  because  of  the  dispersion  of  the  minority  population,  a  
reasonably compact majority-minority district cannot be created, § 2 does not require a majority-minority district; if 
a reasonably compact district can be created, nothing in § 2 requires the race-based creation of a district that is far 
from  compact.”). 
93 Shaw v Hunt, 517 US 899, 916 (1996). 
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that  the  district  contains  a  ‘geographically  compact’ population of any race.”94 Similarly, the 
Court rejected a  Texas  district  that  “reaches  out  to  grab  small  and  apparently  isolated  minority  
communities.”95 “These  characteristics  defeat  any  claim  that  the  district[]”  was  necessitated by 
Section 2.96  
 
 Under Section 5, on the other hand, compactness is largely irrelevant to the dispositive 
question: whether  a  district’s  minority  residents  possess the ability to elect the candidate of their 
choice. Whether minorities possess this ability depends on their number, turnout, and political 
cohesion,  but  it  is  not  a  function  of  the  oddness  of  a  district’s  shape. Not surprisingly, 
compactness has played no role in the Court’s  Section  5  decisions (nor in those of the lower 
courts). It should be noted, however, that  during  the  2006  debate  over  Section  5’s  
reauthorization, several Republican senators argued that the goal of the amended provision was 
to  “prevent  states  from  dismantling  .  .  .  ‘geographically compact majority-minority  districts.’”97 
The DOJ also has stated that one of the factors it considers in assessing retrogression is the 
“geographic  compactness  of  a  jurisdiction’s  minority  population.”98 These views have not been 
embraced by the case law, but they do appear in the legislative history and agency guidance. 
 
 The upshot is that when a highly non-compact ability district is eliminated, there is 
retrogression under Section 5 but there (most likely) is no violation of Section 2. The  district’s  
strange shape makes no difference in the Section 5 inquiry, but it clearly means that the district is 
an invalid Section 2 remedy, and it implies as well that no reasonably compact district could be 
drawn in the area. Accordingly, in the wake of Shelby County, most bizarre-looking ability 
districts in the South may be dismantled with legal impunity. How many such districts exist is a 
question to which I turn in Section II.B. 
 
2. Minority Heterogeneity 
 
 The second way in which the Court has constricted the scope of Section 2 is by requiring 
that a district not combine overly dissimilar minority communities. In the 2006 case of LULAC v 
Perry, the Court held that Texas violated the provision when it disbanded an ability district near 
                                                 
94 Id. 
95 Bush, 517 US at 979. 
96 Id. The case law is ambiguous as to whether it is the compactness of the district or of the minority 
population that is relevant under Section 2. The passages from Bush and Shaw suggest that it is district compactness 
that matters. This also has been the conclusion of lower courts adjudicating Section 2 cases. See Katz et al, 39 U 
Mich J L Reform at 662-63 (cited in note 11). However, the original language in Gingles that gave rise to the 
compactness  requirement  asks  whether  “the  minority group .  .  .  is  sufficiently  .  .  .  geographically  compact.”  
Thornburg v Gingles, 478 US 30, 50 (1986) (emphasis added). Justice Kennedy also has repeatedly expressed his 
view  that  “[t]he first Gingles condition refers to the compactness of the minority population, not to the compactness 
of the contested district.”  Bush, 517 US at 997 (Kennedy concurring); see also LULAC v Perry, 548 US 399, 432-33 
(2006). 
97 S Rep No 109-295, at 19 (2006) (quoting testimony of attorney Anne Lewis); see also id at 19 (claiming 
that  new  Section  5  language  was  “designed to prevent legislators from intentionally ‘“cracking”’ or  ‘“fragmenting”’  
geographically compact  minority  voting  communities”  (quoting  testimony  of  NAACP  president  Theodore  Shaw)). 
98 Guidance Concerning Redistricting Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 76 Fed Reg 7470, 7471 
(Feb 9, 2011). 
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Laredo  that  contained  a  “cohesive”  Latino  population  with  “an  efficacious  political  identity.”99 
Had the district not contained such a unified Latino community, it likely would not have received 
Section 2 protection—a claim that can  be  made  confidently  thanks  to  the  Court’s  treatment  of  the  
remedial district that Texas created to compensate for its elimination of the Laredo-area district. 
The remedial district enclosed a clear Latino majority, but nevertheless was rejected by the Court 
because it merged “Latino  communities  .  .  .  [with]  divergent needs and interests owing to 
differences in socio-economic status.”100 As  the  Court  put  it,  “[t]here is no basis to believe a 
district that combines two farflung segments of a racial group with disparate interests provides 
the opportunity that § 2 requires.”101  
 
Following LULAC, it appears that there is no liability under Section 2 when the relevant 
minority  population  is  highly  “spatially  diverse”102 or  “culturally  non-compact.”103 It also 
appears that a district including such a population is not a valid Section 2 remedy. This is the 
case, at least, when the minority groups at issue are both socioeconomically dissimilar and 
geographically separated.104 However, the degree of uncertainty associated with this articulation 
of the legal standard is unusually high. LULAC remains the only Supreme Court case addressing 
this aspect of Section 2 doctrine, and the lower courts have yet to confront many LULAC-based 
defenses to otherwise valid Section 2 claims.105 
 
 Under Section 5, in contrast, the  heterogeneity  of  a  district’s  minority  population  is  
extraneous to whether the population has the ability to elect the candidate of its choice. If the 
population has this ability, then the district that contains it is protected under Section 5—no 
matter how similar or dissimilar the minority members may be. As with geographic 
compactness, there is no hint in the Section 5 case law that retrogression is permissible if a 
district happens to combine disparate minority communities. But as with compactness, 
                                                 
99 548 US 399, 435 (2006); see also id (noting  that  “there  has  been  no  contention  that  different  pockets  of  
the  Latino  population  in  [the  district]  have  divergent  needs  and  interests”). 
100 Id at 424 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
101 Id at 433. 
102 This is the term I have used in earlier work to describe geographic entities (such as districts) whose 
spatial subunits are highly heterogeneous. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Spatial Diversity, 125 Harv L Rev 1905, 
1912-17 (2012); see also id at 1929-33 (arguing that spatial homogeneity has been an implicit Section 2 requirement 
for decades). 
103 See Daniel R. Ortiz, Cultural Compactness, 105 Mich L Rev First Impressions 48, 50 (2006) (“If  the  
Court were to require that plaintiffs establish . . . cultural compactness, Section 2 claims would be much more 
difficult.”);;  Richard  H.  Pildes,  The Decline of Legally Mandated Minority Representation, 68 Ohio St L J 1139, 
1146 (2007) (observing that after LULAC “the Act is not violated . . . unless an election district can be created . . . 
[that  is]  geographically  and  culturally  compact”). 
104 See LULAC,  548  US  at  435  (“We emphasize it is the enormous geographical distance separating the 
Austin and Mexican-border communities, coupled with the disparate needs and interests of these populations—not 
either factor alone—that renders District 25 noncompact for § 2 purposes.”). 
105 Lower court cases that have addressed the heterogeneity of minority populations under Section 2 include 
Ga State Conf of NAACP v Fayette Cty Bd of Comm’rs, ___ F Supp 2d ___, 2013 WL 2948147, at *12 (ND Ga May 
21,  2013)  (finding  that  African  Americans  in  two  nearby  towns  “share  common  socioeconomic  and  political  
concerns”),  Perez v Texas, 891 F Supp 2d 808, 836 (WD Tex 2012) (rejecting proposed district  that  was  “nearly  
identical”  to  district  rejected  in  LULAC), Fletcher v Lamone, 831 F Supp 2d 887, 899 (D Md 2011) (rejecting 
proposed district that combined distinct African American communities in Baltimore and Washington, DC suburbs), 
and Benavidez v City of Irving, 638 F Supp 2d 709, 722 (ND Tex 2009) (finding that although district contained 
Hispanic  neighborhood  that  “may  differ  in  some  demographic  characteristics  from  the  core  area,”  neighborhood  was  
“geographically  close  to  that  core”  and  thus  district was valid Section 2 remedy). 
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Republican senators argued in 2006 that the retrogression inquiry should take this factor into 
account. According to the Senate report they penned,  “the  [new  Section  5]  language  seeks  to  
protect naturally occurring majority-minority  districts”  that  correspond  to  distinct  “‘minority  
voting  communities.’”106 This position has not been adopted by any judicial decision—though 
the Supreme Court, of course, never had the opportunity to consider how the revised Section 5 
should be applied to districts containing heterogeneous minority populations. 
 
 The consequence is that when a district that joins dissimilar minority communities is 
eliminated, retrogression occurs under Section 5 but Section 2 (probably) is not breached. The 
heterogeneity  of  the  district’s  minority population is immaterial under Section 5, but it indicates 
that the district is not a permissible Section 2 remedy, and it also suggests that no district 
containing a sufficiently homogeneous population could be created in the region. Thanks to 
Shelby County, then, most southern districts that merge disparate minority groups now lawfully 
may be dismantled. The number of these districts, again, is the subject of Section II.B. 
 
3. Population Size 
 
 The final limitation the Court has imposed on Section 2 involves the size of minority 
groups. In the 2009 case of Bartlett v Strickland, the Court held that in order for there to be 
liability under the provision, it must be possible to create an additional district in which minority 
members make up a majority of the population.107 “The  special  significance  .  .  .  of  a  majority  
means it is a special wrong when a minority group has 50 percent or more of the voting 
population  and  .  .  .  is  not  put  into  a  district.”108 The Court hinted, however, that districts with 
minority populations below 50 percent might be relevant on the remedial side of the Section 2 
analysis. “States  can—and in proper cases should—defend against alleged § 2 violations by 
pointing  to  .  .  .  effective  crossover  districts.”109 After Bartlett, it is clear that plaintiffs must prove 
that another majority-minority district could be drawn, but it is uncertain whether a majority-
minority district is the only permissible remedy once liability has been established. 
 
 Under Section 5, on the other hand, there is little doubt that districts with minority 
populations below 50 percent are protected if these populations in fact are able (with crossover 
support from white voters) to elect their preferred candidates. In the 2003 case of Georgia v 
Ashcroft, interpreting the pre-amendment version of Section 5, the Court held that the provision 
extends  to  “coalitions  of  voters  who  together  will  help  to  achieve  the  electoral  aspirations  of  the  
minority  group.”110 Similarly, the House report that accompanied Section  5’s 2006 
reauthorization stated that it applies  to  “[v]oting changes that leave a minority group less able to 
                                                 
106 S Rep No 109-295, at 19 (2006) (emphasis added) (quoting testimony of NAACP president Theodore 
Shaw); see also Nathaniel Persily, The Promise and Pitfalls of the New Voting Rights Act, 117 Yale L J 174, 239 
(2007) (flagging  Senate  report’s  references  to  “naturally  occurring”  majority-minority districts). 
107 556 US 1, 18-19 (2009). 
108 Id at 19. 
109 Id at 24. 
110 539 US 461, 480 (2003); see also id at  484  (noting  that  “the  addition  or  subtraction  of  coalitional  
districts is relevant to the § 5 inquiry”);;  id at  492  (Souter  dissenting)  (agreeing  that  Section  5  extends  to  “coalition  
districts, in which minorities are in fact shown to have a similar opportunity when joined by predictably supportive 
nonminority  voters”).   
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elect a preferred candidate of choice, either directly or when coalesced with other voters.”111 And 
in the lone case construing the amended version of Section 5 in the vote dilution context, the 
court  explicitly  ruled  that  “[s]ince . . . crossover districts provide minority groups the ability to 
elect a preferred candidate, they must be recognized as ability districts in a Section 5 
analysis.”112 However, the Republican-drafted  Senate  report  contended  that  the  provision’s  new  
language  “would not lock into place [crossover] districts.”113 
 
 This means, once again, that when an ability district with a minority population below 50 
percent is eliminated, there is retrogression under Section 5 but there (likely) is no violation of 
Section 2. The smaller proportion of minority members is irrelevant under Section 5—as long as 
it is sufficient to enable the election of their preferred candidate—but it suggests that no 
majority-minority district can be drawn in the area, in which case there can be no Section 2 
liability. How many ability districts exist in the South that are not majority-minority districts is 
the final empirical issue that I investigate in Section II.B.  
 
4. Further Twists 
 
 But before turning to the empirical analysis it is important to make three more points 
about the relationship between Section 2 and Section 5 in the vote dilution context. First, while 
until  now  I  have  stressed  the  provisions’  distinctions,  they  also  share  a  number  of  commonalities,  
including in areas where they could have been construed differently. For example, majority-
minority and crossover districts do not exhaust the kinds of constituencies to which the VRA 
might apply. The district taxonomy also includes coalition districts, in which different minority 
groups join together to elect their mutually preferred candidate;114 and influence districts, in 
which the minority population cannot elect the candidate of its choice, but can exert some sway 
over who is elected and what she does once in office.115 Both Section 2 and Section 5 have been 
interpreted to apply to coalition districts (at least when the combined size of the minority groups 
is greater than 50 percent in the case of Section 2).116 And both Section 2 and Section 5 have 
been interpreted not to apply to influence districts (although Section 5 did extend to them prior to 
its 2006 revision).117 
                                                 
111 HR Rep No 109–478, at 71 (2006). 
112 Texas v United States, 831 F Supp 2d 244, 267-68 (DDC 2011); see also Guidance Concerning 
Redistricting  Under  Section  5  of  the  Voting  Rights  Act,  76  Fed  Reg  7470,  7471  (Feb  9,  2011)  (“[T]he  Attorney  
General does not rely on any predetermined or fixed demographic percentages at any point in the [Section 5] 
assessment.”). 
113 S Rep No 109-295, at 21 (2006). 
114 See Bartlett, 556 US at 13. 
115 See id. 
116 See Texas I,  831  F  Supp  2d  at  268  (recognizing  that  under  Section  5  “coalition  districts are ability 
districts”);;  Katz  et  al,  39 U Mich J L Reform at  661  (cited  in  note  11)  (finding  that  under  Section  2  “[m]ost  courts”  
regard coalition-district  claims  as  “cognizable”).  The  Supreme  Court  has  not  explicitly  addressed  the  status  of  
coalition districts under Section 2. See Bartlett, 556 US at 13-14. The Republican-drafted Senate report also opposed 
the extension of Section 5 to coalition districts. See S Rep No 109-295, at 21(2006). 
117 See LULAC v Perry,  548  US  399,  446  (2006)  (holding  that  “the lack of [influence] districts cannot 
establish a § 2 violation”);;  Texas I,  831  F  Supp  2d  at  251  (observing  that,  in  amending  Section  5,  “Congress  sought  
to  make  clear  that  it  was  not  enough  that  a  redistricting  plan  gave  minority  voters  ‘influence’”).  But see Georgia v 
Ashcroft, 539 US 461, 482-83  (2003)  (holding  prior  to  2006  reauthorization  that  “a  court  must  examine  whether  a  
new  plan  adds  or  subtracts  ‘influence  districts’”). 
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 Analogously, both Section 2 and Section 5 are violated when it is established that the 
intent underlying a district plan is racially discriminatory. The current text of Section 5 declares 
outright  that  the  provision  forbids  “any  discriminatory  purpose.”118 The role of motive in Section 
2 analysis is less clear, but most lower courts have concluded that the provision is offended by 
both discriminatory intent and discriminatory results.119 Notably, the Senate report that 
accompanied  the  1982  amendments  to  Section  2  stated  that  “plaintiffs  must  either  prove  such  
intent,  or,  alternatively,  must  show”  the  presence  of  unequal  effects.120 Congress’s  objective in 
revising Section 2 was to clarify that liability could stem from disparate impact, but it had no 
intention of precluding claims based on invidious motivation. 
 
 Furthermore, the array of additional elements that must be demonstrated to prevail on a 
Section 2 claim—minority political cohesion, racial polarization in voting, the nine Senate 
factors, a lack of proportional representation, and the existence of a suitable policy 
benchmark121—do not meaningfully distinguish the provision from Section 5. Minority cohesion 
and racial polarization are not formally part of the Section 5 inquiry, but in practice they must be 
shown in order to prove that a minority population has the ability to elect its preferred candidate. 
“[A] court addressing a proposed voting plan under Section 5 must determine whether there is 
cohesive voting among minorities and whether minority/White polarization is present in the 
jurisdiction submitting the plan.”122 Likewise, the Senate factors play no role in the Section 5 
analysis, either formally or functionally, but they typically are easy to establish in Section 2 
cases in formerly covered areas. Most  of  the  factors  relate  to  a  jurisdiction’s  history  of  
discrimination, and the formerly covered areas include most of the jurisdictions with the most 
egregious such histories.123 
 
                                                 
118 42 USC § 1973c(c); see also note 89 (explaining how this language reversed an earlier Court 
interpretation). 
119 See, for example, United States v Brown, 561 F3d 420, 432-33 (5th Cir 2009); Cousin v McWherter, 46 
F3d 568, 572 (6th Cir 1995); Nipper v Smith,  39  F3d  1494,  1520  (11th  Cir  1994)  (en  banc)  (“[A]  plaintiff  .  .  .  may  
demonstrate a [Section 2] violation by proving either: (1) the subjective discriminatory motive of legislators or other 
relevant officials; or (2) [discriminatory  results].”). 
120 S Rep No 97-417, at 107-08 (1982). 
121 See notes 78-83 and accompanying text (setting forth elements of Section 2 claim). 
122 Texas v United States, 831 F Supp 2d 244, 262 (DDC 2011). Moreover, even if racial polarization were 
relevant to Section 2 but not to Section 5, it remains rampant in most of the formerly covered jurisdictions, and thus 
could be established easily in most cases. See HR Rep No 109-478,  at  34  (2006)  (citing  testimony  that  “the  degree  
of  racially  polarized  voting  in  the  South  is  increasing,  not  decreasing”  and  is  “in  certain  ways  re-creating the 
segregated  system  of  the  Old  South”);;  Protecting Minority Voters at 89-97 (cited in note 48); Stephen Ansolabehere 
et al, Race, Region, and Vote Choice in the 2008 Election: Implications for the Future of the Voting Rights Act, 123 
Harv L Rev 1385, 1403, 1415-16, 1424 (2010) (reporting high and growing levels of polarization in formerly 
covered areas). 
123 See Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at  696  (cited  in  note  11)  (noting  that  under  Section  2  “courts  in  
Southern  states  assumed  or  outlined  a  long  local  and  state  history  of  official  discrimination”);;  Michael  J.  Pitts,  
Redistricting and Discriminatory Purpose, 59 Am U L Rev 1575,  1602  (2010)  (observing  that  “jurisdictions covered 
by Section 5 were subjected to the preclearance requirement in the first place because prima facie evidence of 
voting-related  discrimination  existed”);;  see also Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judicial Ideology and the 
Transformation of Voting Rights, 75 U Chi L Rev 1493, 1519-20 (2008) (describing  “conventional  wisdom  that  
satisfaction of the Gingles factors  correlates  strongly  with  liability”);; Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at 660 (cited 
in  note  11)  (finding  that  57  of  68  opinions  that  ruled  in  minority  group’s  favor  as  to  Gingles preconditions also ruled 
in its favor as to ultimate liability).  
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 As for a lack of proportional representation, it too is not a requirement under Section 5, 
but it too can be demonstrated without difficulty in a Section 2 suit. Both African Americans and 
Hispanics are currently underrepresented in the state legislatures and congressional delegations 
of every formerly covered state.124 Lastly, a suitable benchmark with which to compare a 
challenged policy does not exist in certain kinds of vote dilution cases, such as municipal 
annexations and objections to local governance structures.125 But there is no benchmark problem 
in the redistricting context, in which the alternative district plan proposed by a Section 2 plaintiff 
always may be compared to the plan currently in effect.126 
 
 The second point about the relationship between Section 2 and Section 5 is that it is both 
dynamic and ambiguous. The relationship is dynamic because it shifts whenever the Court 
interprets the provisions, Congress amends them, or the DOJ chooses how to enforce them. For 
instance, the provisions’  gap was smaller with respect to redistricting before the Court began 
limiting the scope of Section 2 in the 1990s.127 Similarly, the gap was larger before Congress 
amended Section 2 in 1982 to clarify that it could be violated by discriminatory results even in 
the absence of discriminatory intent.128 The gap was smaller as well when, in the 1990s, the DOJ 
treated violations of Section 2 as grounds to deny preclearance under Section 5.129 And had the 
Court  responded  to  Section  5’s  reauthorization by construing the provision narrowly, rather than 
by striking it down, the gap again would have shrunk. 
 
 The relationship between the provisions also is ambiguous because their precise coverage 
is uncertain. A generation after its current text was adopted, it remains unclear whether Section 2 
allows crossover districts to be considered as remedies, whether it extends to coalition districts, 
how it governs claims based solely on discriminatory intent, and how the homogeneity of 
minority groups is to be determined.130 As Christopher Elmendorf  has  remarked,  “the  Supreme  
Court has failed to resolve basic conceptual questions about what constitutes an injury within the 
meaning  of  the  statute.”131 If anything, the scope of Section 5 is even hazier. Before the 2006 
                                                 
124 See appendix table 1; see also Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Our Electoral Exceptionalism, 80 U Chi L 
Rev 769, 834 (2013) (describing underrepresentation of minority groups throughout country). 
125 See Holder v Hall, 512 US 874, 884 (1994). 
126 See id at  880  (observing  that  “[i]n  certain  cases,  the  benchmark  for  comparison  in  a  §  2  dilution  suit  is  
obvious”);;  Thornburg v Gingles,  478  US  30,  50  note  17  (1986)  (noting  that  “[t]he  single-member district is 
generally  the  appropriate  standard”  in  redistricting cases). 
127 Conversely, the Court shrank the gap when it made Section 5 more difficult to violate in Reno v Bossier 
Parish Sch Bd, 528 US 320, 328 (2000) (holding that only a retrogressive purpose violates Section 5), and Georgia v 
Ashcroft, 539 US 461, 482-85 (2003) (holding that ability districts may be eliminated if their elimination is offset by 
new influence districts or other gains for minorities). See McCrary et al, The Law of Preclearance: Enforcing 
Section 5 at 27 (cited in note 77) (describing sharp decline in preclearance denials in wake of Bossier Parish II); 
Persily, 117 Yale L J at 199-200 (cited in note 106) (same). 
128 And when Congress overturned Bossier Parish II and Georgia in 2006, it widened the gap by making 
Section 5 easier to violate.  
129 See Bruce E. Cain and Karin MacDonald, Voting Rights Act Enforcement: Navigating Between High 
and Low Expectations, in Epstein et al, eds, The Future of the Voting Rights Act 125, 132 (cited in note 8) 
(commenting  that  during  this  period  “the  distinction  between  section  2  and  section  5  standards  blurred”);;  see also 
Reno v Bossier Parish Sch Bd, 520 US 471, 480-85 (1997) (Bossier Parish I) (rejecting this DOJ interpretation of 
Section 5).  
130 See Sections II.A.1-3. 
131 Christopher S. Elmendorf, Making Sense of Section 2: Of Biased Votes, Unconstitutional Elections, and 
Common Law Statutes, 160 U Pa L Rev 377, 394 (2012). 
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amendments to the provision, the Court addressed its application to redistricting only once, in a 
decision that Congress partially reversed just three years later.132 Since 2006, the Court has not 
expounded at all on the meaning of Section 5, and only a single lower court has explored how it 
relates to redistricting.133 And congressional intent on the subject is more difficult than usual to 
ascertain, thanks to dueling House and Senate reports that take nearly opposite stances on the 
construction of key statutory terms.134 
 
 The final point about how Section 2 and Section 5 interrelate is that the former is not 
always narrower than the latter. As I have discussed above, Section 2 is less effective than 
Section 5 in several respects as a shield for existing ability districts. But, unlike Section 5, 
Section 2 also can be wielded as a sword to win the creation of additional ability districts. When 
plaintiffs meet the Gingles preconditions and show that the totality of circumstances supports 
their claim, their reward—which is unavailable under Section 5—is an increase in the level of 
minority representation.135 
 
 Because it can be used not just defensively but also for offense, Section 2 deserves much 
of the credit for the growing minority presence in the halls of power in recent years. Following 
the 1982 amendments to the provision, plaintiffs prevailed in many Section 2 suits throughout 
the country, usually obtaining as remedies new ability districts.136 The result of this wave of 
litigation  was  “a  quantum  increase  in  minority  representation”  in  the  1990s.137 In the U.S. House 
of Representatives, for example, the number of African Americans elected from the South 
jumped from five to seventeen.138 In the years since this representational spike, Section 5 has 
played a vital role in preserving the gains made by minorities.139 But it was primarily Section 2, 
not Section 5, that made the gains possible in the first place. 
 
B. Empirical Gap 
                                                 
132 This decision, of course, was Georgia v Ashcroft. See also Persily, 117 Yale L J at 234 (cited in note 
106)  (noting  that  “there  is  disagreement about what the standard [before Georgia]  was”). 
133 See Texas v United States, 887 F Supp 2d 133 (DDC 2012), vacd, 133 S Ct 2885 (2013); Texas v United 
States, 831 F Supp 2d 244 (DDC 2011). 
134 See HR Rep No 109-478 (2006); S Rep No 109-295 (2006); see also Persily, 117 Yale L J at 218 (cited 
in  note  106)  (describing  how  “Democrats  and  Republicans  hold  dramatically  differing  views  as  to  what  [the  new  
Section  5]  standard  requires”);;  Pildes,  68 Ohio St L J at  1155  (cited  in  note  103)  (“[T]here  is  a  great  deal of 
ambiguity  and  uncertainty  about  what  Congress  understood  the  renewed  Act  to  mean.”). 
135 But see note 85 (identifying certain rare circumstances in which Section 5 currently can be used for 
offense); note 129 and accompanying text (describing period in 1990s when DOJ treated Section 2 violations as 
grounds to deny preclearance, thus allowing Section 5 to be used for offense).  
136 See HR Rep No 109-478, at  52  (2006)  (“In  many  of  the  [covered]  jurisdictions . . . the initial gains made 
by  minority  voters  were  the  result  of  Section  2  enforcement  .  .  .  .”).  But see Daniel P. Tokaji, If  It’s  Broke,  Fix  It:  
Improving Voting Rights Preclearance, 49 How L J 785, 799-803 (2006) (arguing that Section 5 also deserves credit 
for  minorities’  representation  gains  in  1990s). 
137 Introduction, in David A. Bositis, ed, Redistricting and Minority Representation 1, 1 (University Press 
1998). 
138 See Bernard Grofman et al, Drawing Effective Minority Districts: A Conceptual Framework and Some 
Empirical Evidence, 79 NC L Rev 1383, 1394 (2001). 
139 See Grofman and Brunell, Extending Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Complex Interaction 
Between Law and Politics at 312 (cited in note 8); Michael J. Pitts, The Voting Rights Act and the Era of 
Maintenance, 59 Ala L Rev 903,  922  (2008)  (observing  that  Section  5  “prevent[ed]  any  backsliding  .  .  .  of  gains  in  
descriptive  representation”). 
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The relationship between Section 2 and Section 5 thus is quite complex. But the key point 
for present purposes is that certain districts that used to be protected by Section 5 now may be 
eliminated without violating Section 2. How many such districts are there? Surprisingly, this is 
the first Article to tackle this important question. To answer it, I first identify the existing 
districts that, prior to Shelby County, were shielded by Section 5 because their minority residents 
have the ability to elect the candidate of their choice. I then calculate the number of ability 
districts that are too non-compact or that have minority populations that are too heterogeneous or 
small to qualify for Section 2 coverage. These are the districts that fall into the Section 2 – 
Section 5 gap. 
 
1. The Section 5 Universe  
 
 The best way to determine if minority members in a district have the ability to elect their 
preferred candidate—in which case the district formerly was protected by Section 5—is to 
examine an array of past elections.140 Both district-specific  (i.e.,  “endogenous”)  and  statewide  or  
national  (i.e.,  “exogenous”)  elections  ideally should be considered.141 In combination, these 
elections capture the size, turnout, and political cohesion of the minority population as well as 
the extent of racial polarization in voting, and reveal how often the minority-preferred candidate 
in fact prevails.142 Aided by a ten-day trial143 and fourteen separate experts,144 this was the 
methodology that the only court to decide a Section 5 redistricting  case  after  the  provision’s  
2006 reauthorization employed. 
 
 Unfortunately, the optimal methodology strained the resources of the court and litigants, 
and is infeasible for the entire universe of jurisdictions that previously were covered by Section 
5. Exogenous data from the most recent presidential election, for example, is unavailable for 
most state legislative districts,145 as is detailed knowledge about local political conditions. Since 
I was unable to carry out the first-best form of analysis, I instead took the following approach. 
First, I used Census data146 to find all of the congressional and state legislative districts in 
formerly covered states in which minorities make up more than 50 percent of the citizen voting-
age population (CVAP). I included in my analysis all of the southern and southwestern states to 
which Section 5 previously applied in large part or in full.147 I combined the African American 
and Hispanic populations in each district because these groups tend to vote cohesively 
                                                 
140 See Texas v United States, 887 F Supp 2d 133, 141-44 (DDC 2012), vacd, 133 S Ct 2885 (2013). 
141 See id. 
142 See id at 141-42  (noting  that  endogenous  elections  in  particular  help  “determine  whether  a  district  in  the  
existing,  or  benchmark,  plan  has  an  ability  to  elect”). 
143 See id at 139. 
144 See id at 141. 
145 See 2012 Election Results by Congressional and Legislative Districts, Daily Kos (July 9, 2013), online 
at http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/07/09/1220127/-Daily-Kos-Elections-2012-election-results-by-
congressional-and-legislative-districts [hereinafter Presidential Results by State Legislative Districts] (data 
unavailable for Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Texas state legislative districts). 
146 See Voting Age Population by Citizenship and Race (CVAP), US Census Bureau (last visited Oct 1, 
2013), online at http://www.census.gov/rdo/data/voting_age_population_by_citizenship_and_race_cvap.html. 
147 These states are Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Texas, and Virginia. See Section 5 Covered Jurisdictions, US Dept of Justice (last visited Oct 1, 2013), online at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/covered.php. 
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(particularly in general elections).148 I treated 50 percent as the threshold above which a 
constituency automatically qualifies as an ability district because the Supreme Court took the 
same shortcut in Georgia.149 And I focused on CVAP rather than total or voting-age population 
because the Court also has done so and because CVAP is a superior measure of minority voting 
strength.150 
 
 Second, I used Census data as well as demographic information about elected officials151 
to locate all districts with a minority CVAP above 40 percent and a minority representative. 
Political scientists have found that districts with CVAPs below 40 percent almost never elect 
minority representatives, meaning that they are highly unlikely to be ability districts.152 
Conversely, both political scientists and courts commonly have assumed that minority 
representatives are the preferred candidates of minority members.153 Accordingly, when a district 
has a CVAP over 40 percent as well as a minority representative, it is very probable that its 
minority residents have the ability to elect the candidate of their choice. 
 
 Finally, I cross-checked the ability districts I identified with the limited available 
exogenous data in order to see whether the districts voted for Barack Obama (the minority-
preferred presidential candidate) over Mitt Romney in 2012.154 At the congressional level, 
twenty-four of the twenty-five districts I identified voted for Obama, and the only one that did 
not was a toss-up.155 At the state level, all fifty-six of the districts I identified, and for which data 
                                                 
148 See Texas II,  887  F  Supp  2d  at  158  note  27  (“Our  calculations  use  the  combined  Black  and  Hispanic  
share  of  the  CVAP  .  .  .  .”).  Because  there  are  rarely  large  black  and  Hispanic populations in the same districts—and 
rarely large Hispanic populations in any of the states I examine other than Arizona and Texas—it makes little 
difference whether or not the minority populations are combined. See id (obtaining same results if black and 
Hispanic populations are analyzed separately). 
149 See Georgia v Ashcroft, 539 US 461, 470-71, 487-88 (2003) (repeatedly citing number of majority-
black districts in Georgia senate plan). 
150 See LULAC v Perry, 548 US 399, 423-25, 427-28, 436-38, 441, 443 (2006) (repeatedly referring to 
CVAP). 
151 See Joint Center for Political & Economic Studies, National Roster of Black Elected Officials (2013); 
NALEO, Directory of Latino Elected Officials (2013). I supplemented this data by visiting the websites of the 
representatives from all districts with CVAPs above 30 percent. 
152 See Grofman and Brunell, Extending Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: The Complex Interaction 
Between Law and Politics at 313 (cited in note 8); Charles Cameron et al, Do Majority-Minority Districts Maximize 
Substantive Black Representation in Congress?, 90 Am Pol Sci Rev 794, 805 (1996) (finding that black population 
of 40.3 percent is needed in South for there to be 50 percent chance of electing black representative). 
153 See Bernard Grofman, Operationalizing the Section 5 Retrogression Standard of the Voting Rights Act 
in Light of Georgia v. Ashcroft: Social Science Perspectives on Minority Influence, Opportunity, and Control, 5 
Election L J 250, 256 (2006); Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at 665-66 (cited in note 11); Persily, 117 Yale L J at 
221  (cited  in  note  106)  (“[I]t  is  commonplace  for  courts  to  assume  that  minority  candidates  are  the  minority  
community’s  candidates  of  choice.”). 
154 See Texas v United States, 887 F Supp 2d 133, 142 (DDC 2012), vacd, 133 S Ct 2885 (2013) (noting 
that  “minority  voters  almost  always  prefer  Democratic  candidates”  and  that  “minority  voters  lack  an  ability  to  elect  
in  a  benchmark  district  carried  by  John  McCain  over  Barack  Obama”). 
155 See Presidential Results by Congressional District for the 2012 and 2008 Elections, Daily Kos (Nov 19, 
2012), online at http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/11/19/1163009/-Daily-Kos-Elections-presidential-results-by-
congressional-district-for-the-2012-2008-elections?detail=hide. The one exception was Texas Congressional District 
23, which gave Obama 48.1 percent of the vote, but which has a combined minority CVAP of 64.5 percent and 
elected a Hispanic Democrat in 2012.  
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was available, voted for Obama as well.156 These results help confirm that the districts I 
identified indeed are ones in which minorities are able to elect the candidate of their choice. 
 
 Table 1 in the Appendix, then, lists by body and state all of the districts that formerly 
were protected by Section 5.157 There are a total of 404 such districts, 25 in the U.S. House, 92 in 
state senates, and 287 in state houses. In absolute terms, Georgia has the most such districts (77) 
while Arizona has the least (18). As a share of all districts, Texas has the highest proportion of 
previously shielded districts (33.6 percent) while Virginia has the lowest (12.6 percent). The gap 
between the proportion of previously shielded districts and the statewide minority CVAP share is 
highest in Virginia (10.4 percent) and lowest in Alabama (1.4 percent). Over the whole nine-state 
region, the deviation from proportionality is 5.1 percent.  
 
2. Geographic Compactness 
 
 Which of these formerly protected districts now may be disbanded because they are too 
non-compact to qualify for Section 2 coverage? In a landmark 1993 study, Richard Pildes and 
Richard Niemi identified eleven majority-black and majority-Hispanic U.S. House districts that 
they believed might be in legal danger because of their odd shapes.158 They included in their list 
all districts with sufficiently poor dispersion or regularity scores.159 A  district’s  dispersion  refers  
to how spread out its territory is, i.e., whether the district is long and narrow or essentially 
circular.160 A  district’s  regularity  indicates how even its  perimeter  is,  i.e.,  whether  the  district’s  
borders are contorted or smooth.161 Of the eleven districts that Pildes and Niemi named, seven 
were struck down by the courts over the course of the ensuing decade.162 Seven, that is, were so 
non-compact that they were both constitutionally suspect and beyond the scope of Section 2. 
This is a very impressive record that justifies my use here of the same compactness 
methodology. 
 
 Accordingly, I first calculated dispersion and regularity scores for all of the districts that 
previously were protected by Section 5.163 I then used the same cutoffs as Pildes and Niemi in 
order to identify the districts that are so non-compact that they likely are uncovered by Section 
                                                 
156 See Presidential Results by State Legislative Districts (cited in note 145). Data was available for state 
legislative districts in Arizona, North Carolina, and Virginia. 
157 See appendix table 1. 
158 See Richard H. Pildes and Richard G. Niemi, Expressive  Harms,  “Bizarre  Districts,”  and  Voting  
Rights: Evaluating Election-district Appearance After Shaw v. Reno, 92 Mich L Rev 483, 564 (1993). They also 
included seventeen other districts in their list. See id. 
159 See id (using as cutoffs dispersion score of less than or equal to 0.15 and regularity score of less than or 
equal to 0.05); see also id at 554 note 200, 555 note 203 (providing technical details for calculations of scores). 
160 See id at 549. 
161 See id. 
162 See Bush v Vera, 517 US 952 (1996) (striking down Texas Districts 18, 29, and 30); Shaw v Hunt, 517 
US 899 (1996) (striking down North Carolina District 12); Diaz v Silver, 978 F Supp 96 (ED NY 1997) (striking 
down New York District 12); Johnson v Mortham, 926 F Supp 1460 (ND Fla 1996) (striking down Florida District 
3); Hays v La, 862 F Supp 119 (WD La 1994) (striking down Louisiana District 4). 
163 I did so using  Caliper  Corporation’s  Maptitude  for  Redistricting  software. I obtained congressional and 
state legislative district plans from 113th Congressional District TIGER/Line Shapefiles, US Census Bureau (last 
visited Oct 1, 2013), online at http://www.census.gov/cgi-bin/geo/shapefilesrd13/main. 
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2.164 As Table 2 in the Appendix reveals, there are twenty-two such districts, five in Congress, 
four in state senates, and thirteen in state houses.165 North Carolina and Texas account for all of 
the strange-looking congressional districts, while Georgia and North Carolina lead the pack at 
the state house level.166 (No state is especially noteworthy at the state senate level.) Figures 1 and 
2 also display maps of the formerly protected districts with the very worst dispersion and 
regularity scores. North  Carolina’s  Twelfth  Congressional District, which closely resembles the 
constituency that gave rise to the racial gerrymandering cause of action in the 1990s,167 has the 
lowest dispersion and regularity scores of any district in my study. North Carolina also features 
four of the five most irregular ability districts in the South. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1: ABILITY DISTRICTS WITH WORST DISPERSION SCORES 
 
                                                 
164 See note 159 (identifying cutoffs). 
165 See appendix table 2. 
166 See id. 
167 See Shaw v Reno, 509 US 630 (1993). However,  the  district’s  current  version  is  not  quite  as  ugly  as  the  
one struck down in the 1990s. See Pildes and Niemi, 92 Mich L Rev at 564 (cited in note 158) (district formerly had 
dispersion score of 0.05 and regularity score of 0.01). Also, I only include the district in Figure 1. The four districts 
in Figure 2 thus are the second- to fifth-worst in the South with respect to regularity. 
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FIGURE 2: ABILITY DISTRICTS WITH WORST REGULARITY SCORES 
 
NC Congress 12 TX Congress 35
LA House 21 SC House 109
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 But while there do exist districts that are likely beyond the legal pale, the more important 
point is that there are only very few such districts. If 22 districts are so non-compact that they 
might be uncovered by Section 2, then 382 districts have shapes that are unproblematic under the 
provision. Why are the vast majority of ability districts sufficiently compact to qualify for 
Section 2 protection? The answer is probably that contemporary line-drawers have learned from 
the dramatic events of the 1990s, when the courts struck down bizarre-looking ability districts 
throughout the country. Line-drawers have found ways, that is, to continue drawing ability 
districts while making their shapes less aesthetically offensive.168 Notably, there are more ability 
districts today than there were in the 1990s, but, at least at the congressional level, the number of 
highly non-compact  districts  (using  Pildes  and  Niemi’s  cutoffs)  has  fallen  from  eleven  to  five. 
 
 The other significant point about these statistics is that they are not a foolproof measure 
of either liability under the Constitution or lack of coverage under Section 2. First, compactness 
scores can be misleading because they stem, to some degree, from the shape of the states in 
                                                 
168 See Richard H. Pildes, The Supreme Court, 2003 Term — Foreword: The Constitutionalization of 
Democratic Politics, 118 Harv L Rev 28, 68 (2004) (“[L]egislators . . . internalized [the  courts’  rulings], not as 
barring them from intentionally creating [ability] districts, but as imposing general, extrinsic limits on the extent to 
which districts could be non-compact.”). 
LA Senate 29 NC House 48
NC House 7 NC Congress 1
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which districts are located. It is not entirely surprising that North Carolina performs so poorly 
given the contorted profile of its eastern shore.169 Second, the constitutional definition of a racial 
gerrymander is a district that was created with  “race  [as]  the  predominant,  overriding  factor.”170 
A  district’s  strange shape  is  “persuasive  circumstantial  evidence”  that  race  was  emphasized too 
heavily,  but  it  is  not  a  “necessary  element  of  the  constitutional  wrong.”171 Third,  a  district’s  
strange shape also does not demonstrate conclusively that it is an invalid Section 2 remedy. As 
noted earlier, some uncertainty lingers as to whether Gingles’s  compactness  requirement  applies  
to districts or to minority populations.172 And fourth, even if the requirement applies to districts, 
that a reasonably compact district was not drawn does not necessarily mean that one could not be 
drawn in the same area. If one could be drawn, then there indeed would be liability under Section 
2 if an existing non-compact district was eliminated. 
 
 Notwithstanding these caveats, compactness scores are the best available proxy for both 
racial gerrymandering and lack of Section 2 coverage due to strange district shape. And the clear 
import of the scores is that very few current districts are so oddly configured that they now may 
be dismantled without violating Section 2. Next I consider the empirical evidence about the 
heterogeneity  of  ability  districts’  minority  populations—the second reason why a district 
formerly protected by Section 5 now may be beyond the scope of Section 2.  
 
3. Minority Heterogeneity 
 
 In  previous  work  of  mine,  I  developed  a  technique  for  measuring  the  “spatial  diversity”  
of districts.173 A district is spatially diverse when its geographic subunits vary markedly with 
respect to a given factor. Conversely, a district is spatially homogeneous when its subunits are 
mostly alike with respect to the factor. Spatial diversity also can be applied to  districts’  minority  
populations (as opposed to districts in their entirety).174 In this case, the concept indicates 
whether similar or dissimilar groups of minorities have been combined in a district—that is, 
whether similar or dissimilar minority communities have been merged. If dissimilar minority 
communities have been merged, then a district may be an unlawful racial gerrymander, and it 
also may be uncovered by Section 2.175 
  
 In my earlier work, I calculated spatial diversity scores with respect to composite factors 
derived from a very large set of demographic and socioeconomic data from the Census.176 I also 
used the Census tract as the spatial subunit for my analysis, and included information about all of 
a  tract’s  residents  (rather  than  just  its  minority  members).177 Here I have refined my approach in 
                                                 
169 See Pildes and Niemi, 92 Mich L Rev at  565  (cited  in  note  158)  (“One  must  make  comparisons  carefully  
because of the effects of state  shapes.”). 
170 Miller v Johnson, 515 US 900, 910 (1995). 
171 Id at 913. 
172 See note 96. 
173 See Stephanopoulos, 125 Harv L Rev at 1936-41 (cited in note 102); see also Nicholas O. 
Stephanopoulos, Communities and the California Commission, 23 Stan L & Pol Rev 282, 289-93 (2012). 
174 See Stephanopoulos, 125 Harv L Rev at 1967-68 (cited in note 102). 
175 See Section II.A.2. 
176 See Stephanopoulos, 125 Harv L Rev at 1982-85 table 1 (cited in note 102) (listing nearly one hundred 
variables used in analysis); Stephanopoulos, 23 Stan L & Pol Rev at 315-18 table1 (cited in note 172) (same). 
177 See Stephanopoulos, 125 Harv L Rev at 1938, 1967-68 (cited in note 102). 
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several ways. First, I use the Census block group rather than the Census tract as my spatial 
subunit. Block groups have about one-third the population of tracts,178 and thus allow spatial 
diversity to be calculated more accurately, especially for smaller districts that contain relatively 
few tracts.179 Second, I include only information about block  groups’  African  American  and  
Hispanic residents. I therefore am able to quantify the precise concept in which I am interested: 
the  spatial  diversity  of  ability  districts’  minority  populations.180 And third, I incorporate many 
fewer demographic and socioeconomic variables into my analysis, because the full range of data 
is unavailable for minority members at the block group level. The variables that I incorporate 
encompass age, marital status, education, occupation, and housing—a broad, though not 
exhaustive, list.181 
 
 After assembling this dataset, I carried out a statistical procedure known as factor 
analysis, which simplifies and renders intelligible large volumes of information.182 A single 
composite factor emerged from the analysis, corresponding closely to socioeconomic status.183 
The factor differentiates between block groups whose minority residents live in married 
households, have a high household income, work in professional jobs, and own their homes; and 
block groups whose minority residents have the opposite attributes.184 I then calculated factor 
scores for all of the block groups in the nine states included in my study. These scores indicate 
how the block groups’  minority  populations  perform  in  terms of the newly created factor.185 
Lastly, I determined the standard deviation, with respect to the new factor, of the block groups 
within each congressional and state legislative district. The higher the standard deviation, the 
more likely it is that a district merges dissimilar minority communities, and vice versa.186 
 
 Table 4 in the Appendix, then, lists the 146 current districts whose spatial diversity scores 
exceed that of the remedial district rejected by the Court in LULAC because  it  “combine[d] two 
farflung segments of a racial group with disparate interests.”187 These are the districts that now 
may be eliminated because their minority populations are too heterogeneous to qualify for 
                                                 
178 See Geographic Terms and Concepts – Block Groups, US Census Bureau (last visited Oct 1, 2013), 
online at http://www.census.gov/geo/reference/gtc/gtc_bg.html. 
179 The use of a smaller spatial subunit also tends to increase the magnitude of the spatial diversity score. 
See David W.S. Wong, Spatial Dependency of Segregation Indices, 41 Canadian Geographer 128, 130–31 (1997). 
180 In my previous work, I was unable to quantify the concept directly because I used data about all 
residents of tracts in which minorities make up more than 40 percent of the population. See Stephanopoulos, 125 
Harv L Rev at 1967-68 (cited in note 102). Here I merged the data about African American and Hispanic residents in 
order  to  produce  estimates  about  block  groups’  combined minority populations. 
181 All data is from the 2007-2011 release of the American Community Survey. See 2007-2011 ACS 5-Year 
Estimates, US Census Bureau (last visited Oct 1, 2013), online at 
http://www.census.gov/acs/www/data_documentation/2011_release. 
182 See Stephanopoulos, 125 Harv L Rev at 1938 (cited in note 102). 
183 See appendix table 3. More specifically, a single composite factor with an eigenvalue greater than two 
emerged. See Stephanopoulos, 125 Harv L Rev at 1938 note 179 (cited in note 102) (discussing methodology in 
more detail). 
184 See appendix table 3. 
185 See Stephanopoulos, 125 Harv L Rev at 1939 (cited in note 102). 
186 See id at 1939-40. Because only a single noteworthy factor emerged from the factor analysis, I did not 
need to compute a weighted average of the scores for different factors. See id at 1940. 
187 LULAC v Perry, 548 US 399, 433 (2006); see appendix table 4. 
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Section 2 protection. Of these districts, sixteen are in Congress,188 forty-one are in state senates, 
and eighty-nine are in state houses.189 Georgia and Texas have the largest numbers of these 
districts (thirty-three each), while Arizona has the fewest (just four).190 Figure 3 also displays 
maps of the five worst-performing districts in the South, along with the district rebuffed in 
LULAC. The darker a block group is colored, the higher its factor score is (and thus the higher 
the socioeconomic status of its minority population).191 All of the mapped districts merge 
dissimilar minority communities—typically disadvantaged urban areas and more affluent 
suburbs—and therefore are likely beyond the scope of Section 2.  
 
FIGURE 3: ABILITY DISTRICTS WITH WORST SPATIAL DIVERSITY SCORES 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
188 Using my original methodology, I found in previous work that twenty-one congressional districts in the 
2010 cycle contained minority populations that were more heterogeneous than that of the district rejected in LULAC. 
See Stephanopoulos, 125 Harv L Rev at 1978 (cited in note 102). The consistency of these findings is encouraging. 
189 See appendix table 4. 
190 See id. 
191 Data is missing for uncolored block groups, which were omitted as well from the factor analysis. 
GA House 88 LA Senate 7
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 The most startling aspect of these findings is the sheer number of potentially unprotected 
districts. The 146 districts with overly heterogeneous minority populations amount to more than 
one-third of all districts formerly shielded by Section 5. If all of these districts were disbanded, 
minority representation in the South would decline precipitously, thus realizing the worst fears 
voiced by commentators after LULAC.192 Why is this segment of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap 
so large when the compactness segment is so small? One possible answer is that line-drawers 
have not yet internalized LULAC the  way  they  have  the  Court’s  racial  gerrymandering  
decisions.193 LULAC is a much more recent case, and to date it is the only Section 2 case to focus 
so intently on the composition of districts’  minority populations. Another possibility is that 
ability districts simply cannot be drawn in many areas in the South without combining disparate 
minority communities. Minorities may be geographically distributed in such a way that districts 
with more spatially homogeneous minority populations cannot be created—even if line-drawers 
would like to create them.194 
 
 As with the compactness analysis, certain caveats about these findings must be 
mentioned. First, the concept of spatial diversity captures variation only with respect to 
quantifiable demographic and socioeconomic variables. To the extent that communities are 
generated by subjective feelings of affiliation, their improper fusion cannot be detected by a 
numerical score. Second, that a district contains an overly heterogeneous minority population 
does not necessarily mean that liability under Section 2 cannot be established if the district is 
eliminated. It may be possible in some circumstances to design a district with a sufficiently 
homogeneous minority population in the same area, in which case there would be liability. And 
third, the Court declared in LULAC that the remedial district was invalid both because it joined 
dissimilar minority communities and because these communities were very far from one other.195 
                                                 
192 See Ortiz, 105 Mich L Rev First Impressions at 50 (cited in note 103); Pildes, 68 Ohio St L J at 1146 
(cited in note 103); Stephanopoulos, 125 Harv L Rev at 1978-79 (cited in note 102). 
193 See Pildes, 118 Harv L Rev at 68 (cited in note 168) (making internalization point in racial 
gerrymandering context).  
194 However, the record of Arizona, the only state in my study that relies on an independent commission to 
design its districts, counsels against this interpretation. Arizona has fewer ability districts with overly spatially 
diverse minority populations than any of the other eight states, perhaps because its independent commissioners 
indeed are able to create ability districts without combining dissimilar minority communities. 
195 See LULAC, 548 US at 435. 
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Districts that join dissimilar minority communities located near one another therefore may fall 
within the ambit of Section 2.  
 
To determine how many districts violate both of the LULAC criteria, I computed an 
additional measure of compactness that indicates the dispersion of a  district’s minority 
population.196 When a district’s  minority population is highly dispersed, minority communities 
are likely to be far from one another (or at least to comprise a small share of the total minority 
population in the broader area). As Table 4 in the Appendix reveals, only six ability districts 
contain minority populations that are both more heterogeneous and more dispersed than that of 
the district rejected in LULAC. If LULAC is construed narrowly, then, its impact may be much 
less dramatic than my analysis initially suggested. Like the compactness criterion, it may expose 
only a handful of unusual districts to elimination without any Section 2 recourse. 
 
4. Population Size 
 
 The final reason why an ability district may fall into the Section 2 – Section 5 gap is that 
its minority population is too small to qualify for Section 2 coverage. As discussed above, 
Section 2 plaintiffs must demonstrate that an additional majority-minority district could be 
drawn, while under Section 5 minorities may be able to elect their preferred candidate even if 
they make up less than 50 percent of  a  district’s  population.197 To determine how many ability 
districts in the South are not majority-minority districts, I simply counted the number of ability 
districts with minority CVAPs below 50 percent. As Table 5 in the Appendix shows, there are 
seventeen such districts, zero in Congress, six in state senates, and eleven in state houses.198 
Arizona and South Carolina account for five of the six state senate districts, while Arizona, 
Georgia, and South Carolina account for nine of the eleven state house districts.199 
 
 The key point about these findings again is the scarcity of ability districts that are not 
majority-minority districts. If 17 districts are beyond the scope of Section 2 because of their 
relatively small minority populations, then 387 districts have enough minority residents to raise 
no legal hackles. The explanation for the scarcity likely is twofold. First, the Supreme Court 
explicitly held in 2009 that there can be liability under Section 2 only if an additional majority-
minority district can be drawn.200 Risk-averse jurisdictions may have sought to forestall Section 
2 litigation by creating majority-minority districts in almost all areas in which their creation was 
feasible. Second, the formation of majority-minority districts probably served the political 
interests of the Republicans who controlled the redistricting process in eight of the nine states in 
my study.201 If ability districts must be drawn, it is preferable from the Republican perspective to 
                                                 
196 See Richard G. Niemi et al, Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test 
for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J Pol 1155, 1165-66 (1990) (discussing population measures of 
compactness). Specifically, I calculated the population circle measure of compactness, but using minority rather than 
total population as the input for the analysis. 
197 See Section II.A.3. 
198 See appendix table 5. In another thirty-seven ability districts, a single minority group does not make up a 
CVAP majority (though African Americans and Hispanics combined do). 
199 See id. 
200 See Bartlett v Strickland, 556 US 1, 18-19 (2009). 
201 See All About Redistricting (last visited Oct 1, 2013), online at http://redistricting.lls.edu/ (featuring 
clickable map showing party in control of redistricting in each state). 
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make their minority populations as large as possible, thus inefficiently packing Democrats into a 
small number of constituencies.202 
 
 Some evidence for the partisan hypothesis comes from the record of Arizona, which 
unlike all the other states in my study relies on an independent commission to draw its district 
lines.203 Arizona has less than 5 percent of the 404 formerly protected districts, but it has more 
than 40 percent of the ability districts with minority CVAPs below 50 percent.204 Because 
Arizona’s  commission  did  not  try to enact a pro-Republican gerrymander, it had no reason to 
create districts with artificially inflated minority populations. The below density curve, showing 
the distribution of minority populations in all Republican-drawn districts in previously covered 
states, provides further support for the partisan hypothesis. The distribution is clearly bimodal, 
with one peak around 20 percent CVAP, where districts tend to be securely (but not 
overwhelmingly) Republican, and a smaller peak around 60 percent CVAP, where Democrats 
usually win by enormous margins. The distribution thus is close to optimal for maximizing the 
number of Republican seats while still drawing the requisite number of ability districts. Notably, 
there are almost no districts in the 30-50 percent CVAP range, in which Democrats are able to 
prevail without wasting their votes in landslide victories.205 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
202 See Cox and Holden, 78 U Chi L Rev at  588  (cited  in  note  7)  (noting  that  “packing  African  American  
voters [is] a second-best  strategy”  for  Republicans  who  are  compelled  by  VRA  to  create  majority-minority districts). 
203 See note 194 (noting that Arizona commission also created very few districts with overly heterogeneous 
minority populations). 
204 See appendix table 5. 
205 See Georgia v Ashcroft, 539 US 461, 470, 487 (2003) (noting larger number of these districts in plan 
drawn by Democrats). The size of this segment of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap thus depends on the partisanship of 
the redistricting authority. This segment of the gap is small when Republicans draw district lines and large when 
Democrats are in charge. 
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FIGURE 4: DISTRIBUTION OF REPUBLICAN-DRAWN DISTRICTS IN FORMERLY COVERED AREAS 
 
  
 
 Once again, a few caveats about these findings must be noted. First, because of the 
Supreme  Court’s  ambiguity  in  Bartlett, it is not entirely clear that ability districts with minority 
CVAPs below 50 percent are beyond the scope of Section 2. These districts may be valid 
remedies even if the fact that they can be drawn cannot establish liability.206 Second, even if 
these districts are not valid remedies, that a majority-minority district was not created does not 
necessarily mean that one could not be created in a given area. If one could be created, then there 
indeed would be liability if an existing ability district was dismantled. Lastly, the distribution of 
minority populations suggests, but does not quite prove, that partisan advantage was the 
dominant line-drawing motivation in the formerly covered states. The distribution was not very 
different in earlier decades when Democrats were largely responsible for redistricting, probably 
because the DOJ pressured states to draw majority-minority districts rather than ability districts 
with minority CVAPs below 50 percent.207 
 
C. Odds of Exploitation 
 
                                                 
206 See note 109. 
207 See Lisa Handley et al, Electing Minority-Preferred Candidates to Legislative Office: The Relationship 
Between Minority Percentages in Districts and the Election of Minority-Preferred Candidates, in Bernard Grofman, 
ed, Race and Redistricting in the 1990s 13, 32-33 (Algora 1998) (documenting enormous 1990s decline in districts 
with minority proportions between 30 percent and 50 percent); Richard H. Pildes, Is Voting-Rights Law Now at War 
with Itself? Social Science and Voting Rights in the 2000s, 80 NC L Rev 1517, 1568 (2002) (same). 
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There are quite a few ability districts in the South, then, that may be eliminated in the 
wake of Shelby County. Which of these districts in fact will be eliminated? It is too soon to know 
for certain, but I explore below the reasons why both Republican and Democratic line-drawers 
sometimes may wish to preserve the districts that populate the Section 2 – Section 5 gap—but 
sometimes may wish to disband them. 
 
To begin with, line-drawers from both parties may be unsure at times whether particular 
districts may or may not be jettisoned. As discussed above, the contours of both Section 2 and 
Section 5 are quite hazy,208 meaning that it often is unclear whether districts previously protected 
by Section 5 now are covered by Section 2. Line-drawers may decide that discretion is the better 
part of valor, preserving districts that perhaps do not need to be preserved in order to avoid the 
cost and uncertainty of litigation. According to Bruce Cain and Karin MacDonald, this is 
precisely the course that many jurisdictions chose after earlier Court decisions that allowed 
ability districts to be eliminated. “[T]he  legal  advice  that  most  jurisdictions  [received]  was  .  .  .  .  .  
[p]reserve  the  status  quo  and  do  not  attract  attention.”209 
 
Line-drawers from both parties also may be disinclined to exploit the Section 2 – Section 
5 gap because they are satisfied with the status quo. Republicans, first, have found that the 
creation of majority-minority districts allows the enactment of district plans that tilt dramatically 
in their favor. By packing their opponents into majority-minority districts, they often can ensure 
that popular support for Democrats does not translate into a commensurate number of legislative 
seats.210 Notably, when many new majority-minority districts were drawn in the 1990s, 
Republicans won about a dozen more congressional seats as a direct consequence,211 while also 
making gains in every southern state legislature.212 Similarly, the recently enacted plans for the 
2010 cycle—all passed while Section 5 was still in effect—arm Republicans with a distinct 
electoral advantage. At the congressional level, the pro-Republican bias in the eight Republican-
controlled states in my study averaged 9.7 percent in 2012. If Republicans had received 50 
percent of the vote in these states, that is, they would have won 59.7 percent of the available 
                                                 
208 See notes 130-134 and accompanying text. 
209 Cain and MacDonald, Voting Rights Act Enforcement: Navigating Between High and Low Expectations 
at 135 (cited in note 129); see also id (noting preference of incumbents to minimize alterations to existing districts); 
Pitts, 59 Ala L Rev at 955  (cited  in  note  139)  (“[M]any  .  .  .  politicians  .  .  .  have  a  self-interest in maintaining the 
status quo with  regard  to  minority  voting  rights.”). 
210 See Pildes, 80 NC L Rev at 1558 (cited in note 207)  (“[T]he Republican Party has come to recognize 
that  the  ‘safe  districting’ approach of the 1990s favors its partisan interests .  .  .  .”);;  Persily,  117  Yale L J at 250 (cited 
in note 106). 
211 See Kevin A. Hill, Does the Creation of Majority Black Districts Aid Republicans? An Analysis of the 
1992 Congressional Elections in Eight Southern States, 57 J Pol 384, 399 (1995); David Lublin & D. Stephen Voss, 
The Partisan Impact of Voting Rights Law, 50 Stan L Rev 765, 772 (1998). 
212 See David Epstein et al, Estimating the Effect of Redistricting on Minority Substantive Representation, 
23 J L, Econ & Org 499, 506 (2007); David Lublin and D. Stephen Voss, Racial Redistricting and Realignment in 
Southern State Legislatures, 44 Am J Pol Sci 792, 793 (2000). 
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seats.213 One can see why Republicans might hesitate to upset such an auspicious political 
landscape.214 
 
 In the increasingly rare instances when they are responsible for redistricting in the South, 
Democrats too may have an incentive to retain the status quo. Minorities are very influential 
members of the Democratic coalition (especially in the South, where whites are overwhelmingly 
Republican), and they typically do not want existing ability districts to be eliminated. Quite 
understandably, minorities tend to assign a high value to descriptive representation, even if it 
comes at some cost to Democratic electoral prospects.215 But just as Republicans may keep 
constant the number of ability districts while increasing their minority populations, Democrats 
may maintain their number while reducing their minority populations to the lowest level that still 
enables the election of the minority-preferred candidate. This, at any rate, was the approach the 
Democrats took in Georgia in 2000, when they still controlled the redistricting process in a state 
growing steadily more Republican. As the Supreme Court later recounted, Democrats did not 
dismantle a single majority-black district, but they did “reduce[] by five the number of districts 
with a black voting age population in excess of 60 percent,”  and  “increase[] the number of 
districts with a black voting age population of between 25 percent and 50 percent by  four.”216 
 
  But while there may be favorable strategies for both parties that are consistent with the 
preservation of existing ability districts, it does not follow that these strategies are optimal. In 
fact, there is good reason to think that both parties could benefit electorally by eliminating at 
least some current ability districts. Starting with the Republicans, they often could win even 
more seats by converting ability districts, which are almost always carried by Democrats, into 
Republican-leaning constituencies. Consider Georgia again, which has fourteen congressional 
districts, four of which are ability districts whose minority populations likely are too 
heterogeneous to qualify for Section 2 coverage.217 Free  from  Section  5’s  constraints,  
Republicans easily could redraw one or more of these districts so that their minority populations 
no longer are large enough to elect Democrats (let alone minority-preferred candidates). The 
only price Republicans would pay for such revisions is a somewhat lower margin of victory for 
their  candidates  in  the  state’s  other  districts. 
 
 That the Section 5 regime was not optimal for Republicans also can be inferred from 
Texas’s  actions  since  Shelby County in its ongoing redistricting litigation. The  Supreme  Court’s  
decision voided a lower  court’s  refusal  to  preclear  Texas’s  district  plans,218 at which point the 
DOJ petitioned a different lower court to subject the state to preclearance under Section 3 of the 
                                                 
213 This data is on file with the author. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The Consequences of 
Consequentialist Criteria, 3 UC Irvine L Rev (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 9, 12-13) (describing assembly of 
electoral database and calculation of partisan bias). 
214 And even if Republicans believe they can make gains by upsetting the landscape, the gains may not be 
large enough to be worth the controversy of redrawing district lines in the middle of a decade. The districts that 
populate the Section 2 – Section 5 gap thus are likely safe until the next redistricting cycle. 
215 See Georgia v Ashcroft, 539 US 461, 470 (2003) (describing goal of African American legislators in 
Georgia  to  “maintain[] at least as many majority-minority districts”  as  prior  plan). 
216 Id at 470-71. 
217 See appendix table 4. 
218 See Texas v United States, 133 S Ct 2885 (2013). 
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VRA.219 If preclearance were consistent with the most pro-Republican possible outcomes, then 
Texas might  have  been  expected  to  accede  to  the  DOJ’s  Section  3 request. But Texas did not 
accede,  instead  filing  a  furious  memorandum  in  opposition  to  the  DOJ’s  motion.220 Texas’s  
“redistricting  decisions  [are]  designed  to  increase  the  Republican  Party's  electoral  prospects  at  
the  expense  of  the  Democrats,”  stated  the memorandum—a goal that presumably can be 
achieved more easily in the absence of preclearance.221 
 
 The  status  quo’s  non-optimality for Republicans is further confirmed by recent 
theoretical work by Adam Cox and Richard Holden.222 Cox and Holden demonstrate that the 
ideal  strategy  for  maximizing  a  party’s  seats  is  not  to  “pack  and  crack”  the  opposing  party’s  
voters,  but  rather  to  “match  slices”  of  the  party’s  most  committed  supporters  with  slightly  
smaller  cohorts  of  the  opposing  party’s  most loyal backers.223 In southern states in which African 
Americans vote more reliably Democratic than any other group, the implication is that 
Republican line-drawers should create districts in which blacks make up slightly less than a 
majority and steadfast conservatives make up slightly more than a majority. The implication, in 
other words, is that Republican line-drawers should not create any ability districts at all. As Cox 
and  Holden  put  it,  “there  is  no  plausible  distribution  of  African  American  voters  that  would  make  
it optimal for Republican redistricting authorities to create districts in which African Americans 
make  up  a  []majority  of  voters.”224 
 
 If blacks in fact are the most dependable Democratic voters in the South, then the best 
strategy for Democrats would be to maintain (or even increase) the number of ability districts, 
but to combine slim black majorities with minorities of staunch conservatives.225 Such districts, 
unlike most current ability districts, would elect black Democrats by very small margins. But if 
there are at least some whites in the South who are as likely as blacks to vote for Democrats (in 
college towns, for instance), then the best Democratic strategy would be to create districts in 
which this liberal inter-racial coalition constitutes a slender majority. If the white populations of 
such districts are large enough, then minorities might not be able to elect the candidates of their 
choice. Similarly, if whites as heavily Republican as blacks are Democratic do not exist, or 
cannot be joined with black communities due to geographic constraints, then the best Democratic 
strategy would be to create districts in which blacks are a minority and white voters carry 
Democratic candidates to victory. Again, minorities might not be able to elect the candidates of 
their choice in such districts if their white populations are large enough. 
 
                                                 
219 See Statement of Interest of the United States with Respect to Section 3(c) of the Voting Rights Act, 
Perez v Texas (WD Tex July 25, 2013). 
220 See Defendants’  Response  to  Plaintiffs and the United States Regarding Section 3(C) of the Voting 
Rights Act, Perez v Texas (WD Tex Aug 5, 2013). 
221 Id at 19. 
222 See Cox and Holden, 78 U Chi L Rev at 553 (cited in note 7). 
223 See id at 564-72. 
224 Id at 574. However, geographic constraints sometimes may prevent the enactment of optimal pro-
Republican gerrymanders. Staunch conservatives sometimes may not live close enough to large black populations to 
permit their  combination  in  the  same  districts.  In  these  cases,  “pack  and  crack”  would  be  the  best  Republican  
strategy, and at least some ability districts would be created, albeit with overwhelming black majorities. 
225 See id at  573  (arguing  that  ideal  tactic  for  Democrats  is  to  “draw  the  maximum  possible  number  of  
majority-minority  districts  in  the  state”). 
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 It should come as little surprise that the pre-Shelby County status quo was not optimal for 
either party. The point of Section 5, after all, is to prevent the diminution of minority voting 
strength, not to assure either party the most efficient possible conversion of its popular support 
into legislative power. But now that Section 5 effectively has been nullified, both parties are 
freer than they used to be to pursue their most electorally beneficial strategies. In at least some 
cases, these strategies will entail the exploitation of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap—that is, the 
elimination of districts previously protected by Section 5 but now uncovered by Section 2. 
 
III. VOTE DENIAL 
 
The VRA prohibits not only the dilution of the vote but also its denial. The vote may be 
denied when franchise restrictions—such as photo ID requirements for voting, proof-of-
citizenship requirements for registering to vote, limits on voter registration drives, cutbacks to 
early voting, and the like—prevent minority members from casting ballots. After several decades 
in which few were adopted, franchise restrictions have surged in popularity in recent years. In 
2011 and 2012 alone, nineteen states enacted some kind of ballot access limitation.226 
 
In this Part, then, I explore the Section 2 – Section 5 gap in the context of vote denial. I 
begin by describing how the provisions diverge substantively when vote denial claims are 
asserted. Under Section 2, plaintiffs typically need to show not only that a statistical disparity 
exists between minorities and whites, but also that a franchise restriction interacts with social and 
historical conditions to cause the disparity. Under Section 5, on the other hand, a disparate 
impact alone usually suffices to prevent a restriction from taking effect. However, these 
statements of the operative standards necessarily are rather tentative. Thanks to the paucity of 
lower court decisions—and the lack of any relevant Supreme Court precedent—it remains quite 
unclear how either provision applies to vote denial. 
 
Next I rely on case outcomes to estimate the magnitude of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap. 
For instance, no plaintiff yet has prevailed in a Section 2 challenge to a photo ID law, while three 
such laws were blocked, at least temporarily, by Section 5. Similarly, a Florida law that curtailed 
early  voting  was  denied  preclearance  with  respect  to  the  state’s  five  formerly  covered  counties,  
but upheld under Section 2 with respect to the rest of the state. But too much should not be made 
of these few examples. Several franchise restrictions have been struck down under Section 2, and 
several Section 2 defeats should be attributed to poor litigation tactics rather than  the  provision’s  
inherent limitations. 
 
Lastly I assess the likelihood that the space between Section 2 and Section 5 will be 
seized. Franchise restrictions commonly are thought to disadvantage Democrats, whose 
supporters are considered less likely to be able to comply with them. Accordingly, when 
Republicans are in control of state governments, their political incentives will point uniformly 
toward the enactment of new ballot access limitations. Indeed, a spate of such measures already 
have been passed by southern states in the brief period since Shelby County was decided. 
Conversely, when Democrats are in charge, they will have no reason to try to restrict minorities’ 
ability to vote. 
 
                                                 
226 See Brennan Center for Justice, Voting Law Changes: Election Update 1-6, 17-21 (2012). 
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A. Conceptual Differences 
 
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never decided a vote denial case under either 
Section 2 or Section 5 of the VRA, likely because few franchise restrictions were adopted 
between the statute’s enactment and the mid-2000s.227 In order to determine how the VRA 
applies to vote denial claims, it thus is necessary to turn to the case law of the lower courts—
which itself is both sparse and somewhat muddled.228 Beginning with Section 2, the lower courts 
are in agreement that a mere statistical disparity between minorities and whites does not suffice 
to establish liability. As a Florida court recently put it,  “a plaintiff must demonstrate something 
more than disproportionate impact to establish a Section 2 violation.”229 
 
But  the  lower  courts  disagree  as  to  what  this  “something  more”  actually is. Some courts 
require proof of proximate causation, that is, proof that the franchise restriction at issue is 
directly responsible for the disparity between minorities and whites.230 If some other factor is 
significantly implicated—e.g., lack of minority interest in the election,231 poverty unrelated to 
discrimination,232 a different electoral regulation not contested in the litigation233—then a Section 
2 claim cannot succeed. Other courts focus on the interaction between the franchise restriction 
and social or historical patterns of discrimination.234 They  grant  relief  only  when  the  restriction’s  
disproportionate impact occurs because of such an interaction, for example, if discrimination is 
                                                 
227 See Florida v United States, 885  F  Supp  2d  299,  311  (DDC  2012)  (“[T]he Court has not specifically 
addressed how the retrogression  test  applies  to  ‘ballot  access’ laws.”);;  Tokaji,  57  SC L Rev at 709 (cited in note 10) 
(“While Gingles and its progeny have generated a well-established standard for vote dilution, a satisfactory test for 
vote denial cases under Section 2 has yet to emerge.”). 
228 See Janai S. Nelson, The Causal Context of Disparate Vote Denial, 54 BC L Rev 579, 595 (2013) 
(“[T]he legal contours of vote denial claims remain woefully underdeveloped .  .  .  .”);;  Stephen B. Pershing, The 
Voting Rights Act in the Internet Age: An Equal Access Theory for Interesting Times, 34 Loy LA L Rev 1171, 1188-
89 (2001) (noting  that  “through  the  cloud  of  [lower  court]  cases  the  applicable  liability standard is much tougher to 
discern”).  According  to  the  Katz  study,  at  most  72  out  of  322  reported  Section  2  cases  between  1982  and  2005  
involved vote denial rather than vote dilution. See Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform at 656 (cited in note 11); 
Tokaji, 57 SC L Rev at 709 (cited in note 10). 
229 Brown v Detzner, 895 F Supp 2d 1236, 1249 (MD Fla 2012); see also, for example, Smith v Salt River 
Project Agr Imp & Power Dist,  109  F3d  586,  595  (9th  Cir  1997)  (“Several  courts  of appeal have rejected § 2 
challenges  based  purely  on  a  showing  of  some  relevant  statistical  disparity  between  minorities  and  whites.”);;  Wesley 
v Collins, 791 F2d 1255, 1260-61  (6th  Cir1986)  (“[A] showing of disproportionate racial impact alone does not 
establish a per se violation of the Voting Rights Act.”). 
230 See, for example, Gonzalez v Arizona,  677  F3d  383,  405  (9th  Cir  2012)  (en  banc)  (noting  that  “proof  of  
‘causal  connection  between  the  challenged  voting  practice  and  a  prohibited  discriminatory  result’  is  crucial”  
(quoting Smith, 109 F3d at 595)); Sw Voter Registration Educ Project v Shelley, 344 F3d 914, 918 (9th Cir 2003) 
(en banc); Ortiz v City of Phila Office of City Comm'rs Voter Registration Div, 28 F3d 306, 312 (3d Cir 1994) 
(“Section 2 plaintiffs must show a causal connection between the challenged voting practice and the prohibited 
discriminatory result.”);;  Irby v Va Suite Bd of Elections, 889 F2d 1352, 1359 (4th Cir 1989). 
231 See Ortiz, 28 F3d at 313. 
232 See Smith, 109 F3d at 595-96. 
233 See Ortiz, 28 F3d at 317-18. 
234 See, for example, Gonzalez,  677  F3d  at  407  (examining  whether  franchise  restriction,  “interacting  with  
the  history  of  discrimination  and  racially  polarized  voting,”  resulted  in  disproportionate  impact);;  Stewart v 
Blackwell, 444 F3d 843, 851, 879 (6th Cir 2006), superseded by 473 F3d 692 (6th Cir 2007); Wesley, 791 F2d at 
1260; see also Nelson, 54 BC L Rev at 618 (cited in note 228) (recommending this approach); Tokaji, 57 SC L Rev 
at 724 (cited in note 10) (same); compare to Thornburg v Gingles,  478  US  30,  47  (1986)  (“The essence of a § 2 
claim is that a certain electoral law . . . interacts with social and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the 
opportunities enjoyed by black and white voters . . . .”). 
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responsible  for  minorities’  lesser  education,  which  in  turn  makes  them  more  likely  to  misuse 
complicated voting machines.235 And still other courts demand not just a statistical disparity but 
also the satisfaction of relevant factors from the 1982 Senate report.236 Responsiveness to 
minority concerns,237 a legacy of discrimination,238 and socioeconomic differences239 are the 
factors that these courts most often have examined. 
 
 In contrast, a trio of decisions since Section 5 was reauthorized in 2006 have made clear 
that a disproportionate impact does suffice for preclearance to be denied (as long as there also is 
a non-trivial burden on voting). First, a court considering  Florida’s  cutback to early voting 
declared  that  a  franchise  restriction  is  retrogressive  if  “(1) the individuals who will be affected by 
the change are disproportionately likely to be members of a protected minority group; and (2) the 
change imposes a burden material enough that it will likely cause some reasonable minority 
voters not to exercise the franchise.”240 Next,  a  court  evaluating  Texas’s  photo  ID  law  denied 
preclearance because the law disproportionately  affected  the  state’s  minority  voters  and  these  
voters  could  not  procure  valid  IDs  “without  cost  or  major  inconvenience.”241 Lastly, a court 
assessing  South  Carolina’s  photo  ID  requirement concurred  that  “[a] state voting law has a 
discriminatory retrogressive effect if the law disproportionately and materially burdens minority 
voters when measured against the pre-existing state law.”242 
 
The upshot of these divergent standards is that some franchise restrictions that previously 
would have been blocked by Section 5 now will be sustained under Section 2. Sometimes a 
plaintiff will be able to establish a statistical disparity between minorities and whites as well as a 
material burden on voting—meaning that preclearance would have been denied—but will be 
unable  to  show  the  “something  more”  required  for  Section  2  liability. For instance, a state might 
enact a non-trivial ballot access limitation that disproportionately affects minority members. But 
it might be unclear that the limitation itself is directly responsible for the disparate impact, or that 
the limitation interacts in any meaningful way with patterns of discrimination, or that enough of 
the relevant Senate factors are satisfied. In this scenario, the limitation would be retrogressive but 
it would not contravene Section 2.  
 
It is important, though, not to overstate the likelihood of this scenario. If a franchise 
restriction disproportionately affects minorities, then it typically will be directly responsible for 
the disparate impact that ensues. Only if another unrelated factor intervenes will the restriction 
not be the proximate cause of the disparity. Similarly, the usual reason why a restriction 
disproportionately affects minorities is that they are poorer or less educated, and the usual reason 
                                                 
235 See Stewart, 444 F3d at 879. 
236 See, for example, Johnson v Governor of State of Florida, 405 F3d 1214, 1227 note 26 (11th Cir 2005) 
(en banc); United States v Berks Cty, 277 F Supp 2d 570, 581 (ED Pa 2003); Roberts v Wamser, 679 F Supp 1513, 
1530 (ED Mo 1987), revd on other grounds, 883 F.2d 617 (8th Cir 1989) (“The Court will then consider each of the 
[Senate] factors .  .  .  .”);;  Ct Citizen Action Group v Pugliese, 1984 US Dist LEXIS 24869, at *12 (D Conn Sept 27, 
1984). 
237 See Pugliese, 1984 US Dist LEXIS 24869, at *12. 
238 See Roberts, 679 F Supp at 1531. 
239 See Berks Cty., 277 F Supp 2d at 581; Roberts, 679 F Supp at 1531. 
240 Florida v United States, 885 F Supp 2d 299, 312 (DDC 2012). 
241 Texas v Holder, 888 F Supp 2d 113, 126, 138 (DDC 2012), vacd, 133 S Ct 2886 (2013). 
242 South Carolina v United States, 898 F Supp 2d 30, 39 (DDC 2012). 
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why they are poorer or less educated is a history of discrimination. It thus will be straightforward 
in many cases to  show  that  a  restriction’s  interaction  with  discriminatory  conditions  gives rise to 
the disparate impact. Lastly, as noted earlier, the Senate factors generally are not difficult to 
establish in the mostly southern jurisdictions that formerly were covered by Section 5.243 
Accordingly, few franchise restrictions that previously would have been denied preclearance 
now will be upheld due to an inability to substantiate these factors.  
 
B. Empirical Gap 
 
The limited number of vote denial cases not only complicates the effort to determine how 
Section 2 and Section 5 differ conceptually. It also makes it difficult to estimate the empirical 
gap between the provisions—that is, the kind and quantity of franchise restrictions that could not 
have withstood Section 5 review but that can survive scrutiny under Section 2. Still, it is possible 
to reach some cautious conclusions based on both the recent spate of state-level restrictions and 
the much larger volume of local policies assessed under the VRA over the last generation. 
 
Beginning with the highest-profile limitations enacted in recent years, photo ID 
requirements for voting, they have been sustained in both of the cases to date that addressed their 
validity under Section 2. First,  a  challenge  to  Georgia’s  photo  ID  law  failed because of 
inadequate proof of a disparity in ID possession between minorities and whites. “[T]he  Court 
simply cannot agree . . . that the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate . . . a substantial likelihood 
of succeeding on the merits [on a]  §  2  vote  denial  claim.”244 Next, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en 
banc,  rebuffed  a  suit  against  Arizona’s  photo  ID  law, again on evidentiary grounds. The court 
noted  that  the  plaintiff  “alleged that  ‘Latinos  .  .  .  are less likely to possess the forms of 
identification required under [the  law]  to  .  .  .  cast  a  ballot,’ but produced no evidence supporting 
this allegation.”245 
 
 In contrast, three photo ID requirements were denied preclearance, at least temporarily, 
under Section 5. In 1994, the DOJ objected to Louisiana’s photo ID law because African 
Americans  were  “‘four  to  five  times  less  likely  than  white  persons  in  the  state to possess a 
driver’s  license  or  other  picture  identification  card.’”246 In 2012, a court denied preclearance to 
Texas’s  photo  ID  law  because  “the burdens associated with obtaining ID will weigh most heavily 
on the poor”  and  “racial minorities in Texas are disproportionately likely to live in poverty.”247 
And  also  in  2012,  another  court  denied  preclearance  to  South  Carolina’s  photo  ID  law  for  the  
next election, but allowed the measure to take effect thereafter.248 
 
 The  fate  of  Florida’s  recent  cutback  to  early  voting also suggests that franchise 
restrictions fare better under Section 2 than under Section 5. A statewide Section 2 challenge to 
the cutback failed because of pledges by several counties to offer the largest possible number of 
                                                 
243 See note 123 and accompanying text. 
244 Common Cause/Georgia v Billups, 406 F Supp 2d 1326, 1375 (ND Ga 2005). 
245 Gonzalez v Arizona, 677 F3d 383, 407 (9th Cir 2012) (en banc) (emphasis added). 
246 Department of Justice, Section 5 Recommendation Memorandum 45 (Aug 25, 2005) [hereinafter DOJ 
Georgia Memo] (quoting DOJ letter to state). 
247 Texas v Holder, 888 F Supp 2d 113, 138 (DDC 2012), vacd, 133 S Ct 2886 (2013). The DOJ also 
objected to the law prior to the judicial proceeding. See id at 117-18. 
248 See South Carolina v United States, 898 F Supp 2d 30, 48-51 (DDC 2012). 
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hours of early voting (which was equal to the number required under prior law).249 But a court 
denied preclearance to the cutback with respect to the five Florida counties formerly covered by 
Section  5,  reasoning  that  “there  is  much  that  we  do  not  know  about  how  the  new  law  will  be 
implemented.”250 The court in the Section 2 case unsubtly hinted that it would have reached a 
different decision had it evaluated the cutback under Section 5. “The important distinction 
between a Section 5 and a Section 2 claim plays a significant role in the  Court’s  decision in this 
case.”251 
 
 Further evidence for the greater efficacy of Section 5 comes from a comparison I 
conducted of the  DOJ’s  preclearance  objections  since  1982252 with recorded Section 2 decisions 
over the same period.253 As Table 6 in the Appendix shows, the scorecard of Section 2 litigation 
was mixed with respect to most kinds of franchise restrictions, while several restriction types 
were blocked repeatedly by Section 5. For example, polling place eliminations were prevented 
nineteen times by Section 5, but only three successful suits and three unsuccessful suits against 
such actions were filed under Section 2.254 Similarly, election date alterations were thwarted 
fifteen times by Section 5, but there was not a single Section 2 challenge, victorious or 
otherwise, to such changes.255 And revisions to voter registration procedures were blocked ten 
times by Section 5, while five Section 2 cases against such amendments succeeded and four 
failed.256 In sum, I counted seventy-three denials of preclearance to franchise restrictions, 
compared to eighteen successful Section 2 claims and nineteen unsuccessful claims.257 
                                                 
249 See Brown v Detzner, 895 F Supp 2d 1236, 1250-52 (MD Fla 2012). 
250 Florida v United States, 885 F Supp 2d 299, 320 (DDC 2012). 
251 Brown, 895 F Supp 2d at 1251. 
252 See Section 5 Objection Determinations, US Dept of Justice (last visited Oct 1, 2013), online at 
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/vot/sec_5/obj_activ.php; Voting Rights Act: Objections and Observers, Lawyers’  
Comm for Civil Rights Under Law (last visited Oct 1, 2013), online at 
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Coalition for Voter Protection v Hood, 351 F Supp 2d 1326, 1335 (MD Fla 2004) (unsuccessful); Trevino v 
Pastrick, 573 F Supp 806, 809 (ND Ind 1983) (unsuccessful); Brown v Dean, 555 F Supp 502, 505 (DRI 1982) 
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255 See appendix table 6. 
256 See id; see also Janis v Nelson, 2009 WL 5216902 (DSD Dec 30, 2009) (successful); Smith v 
Commonwealth of Va, 2009 WL 2175759, at *7 (ED Va July 16, 2009) (unsuccessful); Coleman v Board of Educ of 
City of Mount Vernon, 990 F Supp 221, 229 (SD NY 1997) (unsuccessful); Hernandez v Woodard, 714 F Supp 963, 
969 (ND Ill 1989) (successful); Ashe v Bd of Elec of City of New York, 1988 WL 95427, at *1 (ED NY Sept 8, 1988) 
(unsuccessful); Central Del Branch of NAACP v City of Dover, Del, 123 FRD 85, 87 (D Del 1988) (successful); 
Miss State Chapter, Operation Push v Allain, 674 F Supp 1245, 1268 (ND Miss 1987) (successful); Ct Citizen 
Action Group v Pugliese, 1984 US Dist LEXIS 24869, at *12 (D Conn Sept 27, 1984) (successful); Trevino, 573 F 
Supp at 808-09 (unsuccessful). 
257 See appendix table 6. Of the thirty-nine  Section  2  challenges  to  “election  procedures”  in  Katz’s  
database, thirteen were successful. See VRI Database (cited in note 253); see also Cox and Miles, 108 Colum L Rev 
at  12  (cited  in  note  39)  (finding  success  rate  of  22  percent  for  “remaining catch-all category of [Section 2] 
challenges”).  In  addition  to  the  cases  mentioned above, successful Section 2 suits in the vote denial context include 
Brooks v Gant, 2012 WL 4482984 (DSD Sept 27, 2012), Diffenderfer v Gomez-Colon, 587 F Supp 2d 338 (DPR 
2008), vacd as moot, 587 F3d 445 (1st Cir 2009), Stewart v Blackwell, 444 F3d 843 (6th Cir 2006), superseded by 
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 However, it is unclear whether these statistics should be attributed to  the  provisions’  
divergent standards for liability or to their procedural distinctions.258 The reason why franchise 
restrictions were upheld more often under Section 2 could be its allocation of the burden of proof 
to the plaintiff—not subtle distinctions between disparate impact alone and disparate impact plus 
“something  more.”259 Likewise, the reason why the volume of blocked restrictions was higher 
under Section 5 could be that private parties lacked the resources to mount Section 2 challenges 
to all of the measures they believed to be discriminatory. Unlike in the vote dilution context, 
where it can be determined with some certainty whether districts are protected under Section 2 
and/or Section 5,260 the  provisions’  substantive  and  procedural  differences  are  almost impossible 
to disentangle with respect to vote denial. 
 
 In addition, neither the potency of Section 5 nor the frailty of Section 2 in this domain 
should be exaggerated. For instance, while three photo ID requirements were blocked by Section 
5, at least temporarily, the DOJ did not object to several other such measures. It allowed photo 
ID laws passed by South Carolina in 1984, by Louisiana in 1997, by Alabama in 2002, by 
Arizona in 2004, by Georgia in 2005, and by New Hampshire and Virginia in 2012, all to go into 
effect.261 Conversely, that past Section 2 suits against photo ID laws have failed does not mean 
that future actions will be doomed as well. The plaintiffs in the Arizona and Georgia cases both 
lost because they were unable to present evidence of a disparity in ID possession between 
minorities and whites.262 But this sort of evidence has proliferated in recent years, in both 
academic studies263 and Section 5 proceedings,264 and it likely will feature prominently in future 
Section 2 challenges. 
 
 Analogously, a key reason why Florida’s  cutback  to  early  voting  was  sustained  under 
Section 2, but struck down under Section 5, is  the  more  accurate  information  about  counties’  
intentions that was available by the time of the Section 2 decision. The Section 5 court 
emphasized  that  it  “ha[d] not been presented with a specific voting plan from any of the five 
                                                 
473 F3d 692 (6th Cir 2007), United States v Berks Cty, 277 F Supp 2d 570 (ED Pa 2003), Black v McGuffage, 209 F 
Supp 2d 889 (ND Ill 2002), Marks v Stinson, 1994 WL 146113 (ED Pa Apr 26, 1994), Roberts v Wamser, 679 F 
Supp 1513 (ED Mo 1987), revd on other grounds, 883 F2d 617 (8th Cir 1989), Campaign for a Progressive Bronx v 
Black, 631 F Supp 975 (SDNY 1986), Goodloe v Madison  Cty  Bd  of  Election  Comm’rs, 610 F Supp 240 (D Miss 
1985), and Harris v Graddick, 593 F Supp 128 (D Ala 1984). 
258 See Part  I  (discussing  provisions’  procedural  distinctions). 
259 See Texas v Holder, 888 F Supp 2d 113, 127 (DDC 2012), vacd, 133 S Ct 2886 (2013) (noting that 
“case  does  not  hinge  solely on  the  burden  of  proof”  (emphasis  added)). 
260 See Part  II  (identifying  and  quantifying  provisions’  substantive  differences  with  respect  to  redistricting). 
261 See DOJ Georgia Memo at 42-47 (cited in note 246); see also Voter Identification Requirements, Natl 
Conf of State Legislatures (last visited Oct 1, 2013), online at http://www.ncsl.org/legislatures-
elections/elections/voter-id.aspx. Though it should be noted that these laws varied substantially in their stringency.  
262 See notes 244-245 and accompanying text; see also Gonzalez v Arizona, 677 F3d 383, 442 (9th Cir 
2012) (en banc) (Berzon  concurring)  (“A different record in a future case could produce a different outcome with 
regard to the § 2 causation question.”);;  Tokaji,  57  SC L Rev at 713 (cited in note 10). 
263 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Elections and Alignment, 113 Colum L Rev (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 39-40) (summarizing academic findings about effects of photo ID laws). 
264 See South Carolina v United States,  898  F  Supp  2d  30,  40  (DDC  2012)  (“About  96%  of  whites  and  
about 92–94% of African–Americans currently have one of the R54-listed  photo  IDs.”);;  Texas v Holder, 888 F Supp 
2d 113, 130-38 (DDC 2012), vacd, 133 S Ct 2886 (2013) (discussing series of studies on disparities in ID 
possession). 
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covered  counties,”  and  thus  was unaware whether, and to what degree, the counties would 
reduce their early voting hours.265 In contrast, the Section 2 court  received  notice  that  “32  of 
Florida’s  67  counties  will  offer  the  maximum  number  of  early  voting  hours,”  and  based  its  
decision largely on this data.266 Had the Section 5 court known  about  the  counties’  plans, 
“Florida  would  likely  [have  been]  able  to  meet  its  burden  of  demonstrating  that the overall effect 
of  the  changes  would  not  be  retrogressive.”267 And had the Section 2 court not known about the 
plans,  it  would  have  concluded  that  the  “change  [would]  impose  a  material  burden  on  ‘African-
American  voters’  effective  exercise  of  the  electoral  franchise.’”268 
 
 The figures I provided about DOJ objections and Section 2 cases since 1982 also must be 
taken with a grain of salt. For one thing, the number of objections is dwarfed by the number of 
preclearance submissions that the DOJ did not oppose. According to a report by the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights, between 1982 and 2004, the DOJ objected to only 0.1 percent of 
changes involving precincts, polling places, or absentee voting, 0.1 percent of changes involving 
voter registration procedures, and 0.2 percent of changes involving special elections.269 
Compared to these tiny percentages, the near-50 percent success rate I calculated for Section 2 
litigation over franchise restrictions seems quite respectable.270 Moreover, my count of Section 2 
cases almost certainly is underinclusive because I, like Katz, was able to identify only recorded 
decisions.271 Katz found 160 total Section 2 suits in formerly covered areas between 1982 and 
2005,272 but, including unpublished decisions, there actually were 653 successful such actions 
over this period.273 The true volume of Section 2 activity in the vote denial context therefore 
must be substantially higher than my data indicates. 
 
 A final caveat is that, under certain unusual circumstances, Section 2 may be more 
effective than Section 5 at invalidating franchise restrictions. In particular, when a jurisdiction 
loosens but does not eliminate an existing restriction, the policy change may be non-retrogressive 
but still in violation of Section 2. This sort of scenario unfolded in Mississippi in the 1980s, 
when the state partially dismantled its notorious dual registration system, which had long 
required voters to register in two different ways in order to be able to participate in all 
elections.274 The amendments to the system were precleared by the DOJ because they made it 
easier for African Americans to register.275 But in a subsequent Section 2 action, a court struck 
down the revised regime, which still required dual registration for residents of smaller towns, 
because  of  its  “disparate  impact  on  blacks  .  .  .  ‘who  are  unable,  because  of  disproportionate  lack  
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Justice’s  Record  of  Enforcing  the  Temporary  Voting  Rights  Act  Provisions 30 (2006). Of course, the vast majority of 
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of  transportation  .  .  .  to  travel  to  the  offices  of  the  county  registrar.’”276 It thus was Section 2, not 
Section 5, that finally brought to an end one of the  South’s  most  discriminatory  registration  
practices.  
 
 Accordingly, the empirical evidence on the size of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap is mixed. 
On the one hand, more franchise restrictions, especially of the higher-profile sort, have been 
blocked by Section 5 than by Section 2. On the other hand, the available data likely understates 
the true performance to date of Section 2, and there is reason to think that the provision could be 
even more effective in the future. On balance, the safest conclusion is that there is substantive 
space between Section 2 and Section 5—but that it is not as extensive as it first might seem. 
 
C. Odds of Exploitation 
 
If there indeed is space between the provisions, will it be seized now by politicians in 
formerly covered areas? This question is easier with respect to vote denial than it was with 
respect to vote dilution.277 When Republicans are in control of jurisdictions, the answer almost 
certainly is yes. When Democrats are in charge, the answer most likely is no. 
 
Franchise restrictions commonly are thought to benefit Republicans because they are 
more difficult for poorer and less educated voters, who lean Democratic by large margins, to 
comply with.278 When Pennsylvania passed a photo ID requirement in 2012, for instance, the 
majority leader of the state house famously declared that “[v]oter  ID  .  .  .  is  gonna  allow  
Governor  Romney  to  win  the  state.”279 This is an area in which the conventional wisdom is 
correct (if somewhat overstated). According to several studies, photo ID laws reduce overall 
turnout by 2-3 percent and produce a pro-Republican swing of 1-2 percent.280 Other common 
restrictions, such as the elimination of election-day registration and felon disenfranchisement, 
also give rise to modest pro-Republican shifts.281 
 
The political incentives of Republicans in formerly covered areas thus support the 
enactment of additional ballot access limitations. By enacting such limitations, they favorably 
alter the composition of the electorate and make it more likely that Republican candidates will 
win office. Not surprisingly, southern states controlled by Republicans have passed or 
implemented an array of new limitations in the brief period that has elapsed between Shelby 
County and the writing of this Article.282 Photo ID laws that had been blocked in Mississippi 
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280 See Stephanopoulos, 113 Colum L Rev (cited in note 263) (manuscript at 39-40) (summarizing these 
studies). 
281 See id at 40. 
282 See Brief of Political Science and Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 26-30 
Shelby Cty v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612 (No 12-96) (showing that even before Shelby County covered jurisdictions were 
more likely to enact photo ID laws, proof-of-citizenship requirements, and permanent felon disenfranchisements). 
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(due  to  the  DOJ’s  request  for  more  information)  and  Texas  (due  to  the  court’s  denial  of  
preclearance) now are on the verge of becoming operative.283 Photo ID laws scheduled to go into 
effect in 2014 in Alabama and Virginia now will do so without any prior need for 
preclearance.284 Florida has resumed its effort to purge non-citizens from its voter rolls.285 And 
North Carolina has passed an omnibus bill that includes a photo ID requirement, a cutback to 
early voting, and the elimination of election-day registration.286 It has not taken very long, then, 
for Republicans to begin exploiting the Section 2 – Section 5 gap. 
 
Conversely, Democrats have little reason to take advantage of the gap. They realize that 
franchise restrictions disproportionately harm their own most loyal supporters, and thus oppose 
the measures fiercely wherever they are proposed.287 Were Democrats to find themselves in 
power in any southern state, their political calculus clearly would counsel against the adoption of 
any new restrictions. In fact, the optimal Democratic strategy would be to expand access to the 
polls, through policies such as longer voting hours, more flexible registration procedures, and 
greater absentee and early voting. This is the approach that Democrats have taken recently in 
states where they are in charge of the elected branches.288 It also is the approach that Democrats 
would likely espouse were they to win back control of any formerly covered jurisdiction. 
 
IV. CLOSING THE GAP 
 
The analysis to this point has been descriptive rather than prescriptive. It has 
demonstrated that substantial space exists between Section 2 and Section 5, both procedurally 
and substantively, and that the space is likely to be seized by southern politicians. But it has not 
addressed how the Section 2 – Section 5 gap might be closed, either legislatively or judicially. In 
this Part, then, I discuss a series of steps that Congress or the Supreme Court could take in 
response to Shelby County. I explain how the steps would shrink the Section 2 – Section 5 gap, 
while also pointing out their legal and political limitations. 
 
But before turning to these options, it is worth considering the case for doing nothing—
always the most likely scenario in our cumbersome political system. From a partisan perspective, 
Republicans should cheer inactivity at the national level since it would enable them to enact 
more favorable district plans as well as more stringent franchise restrictions.289 Putting aside 
partisan advantage, one can agree  with  this  Article’s  findings  and  still  support  the  status  quo  if  
one does not consider the cause of minority representation to be particularly important. The 
interaction  of  politicians’  incentives  with  the  Section 2 – Section 5 gap probably will give rise to 
                                                 
283 See Cooper, After Ruling, States Rush to Enact Voting Laws (cited in note 17); Photo Identification 
Requirements (cited in note 261). 
284 See id. 
285 See Alvarez, Ruling Revives Florida Efforts to Police Voters (cited in note 17). 
286 See Aaron Blake, North Carolina Governor Signs Extensive Voter ID Law, Wash Post (Aug 12, 2013), 
online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-politics/wp/2013/08/12/north-carolina-governor-signs-
extensive-voter-id-law/. 
287 See, for example, Crawford v Marion Cty Elec Bd, 553  US  181,  203  (2008)  (“Democrats  were  
unanimous  in  opposing  [Indiana’s  photo  ID  law].”);;  Common Cause/Georgia v Billups, 406 F Supp 2d 1326, 1331 
(ND  Ga  2005)  (Georgia’s  photo  ID  law  voted  for  by  just  two  Democrats  in  state  house  and  zero  in  state  senate). 
288 See Reid Wilson, Democrats Push Back on Voting Rights, Wash Post (Aug 19, 2013), online at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2013/08/19/democrats-push-back-on-voting-rights/. 
289 See Sections II.C, III.C. 
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policies that are electorally worse for minorities than those adopted under the prior regime. But 
this is a problem only if  one  is  concerned  about  minorities’  electoral  position  in  the  first  place. If 
one is indifferent to their position, or more interested in other issues, then indifference is indeed 
the appropriate reaction to Shelby County. 
 
A. Section 4 
 
Assuming that Congress is concerned about minority representation, however,290 there 
are several actions it could take to undo the  damage  inflicted  by  the  Court’s  decision. First, 
Congress  could  accept  the  Court’s  invitation  to  “draft  another  formula  based  on  current  
conditions.”291 Most of the metrics that commentators have suggested would result in many of 
the formerly covered jurisdictions once again becoming subject to preclearance, thus eliminating 
in one stroke the bulk of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap.292 For example, Bernard Grofman293 and 
Ellen Katz294 have proposed basing a new formula on the rate of successful Section 2 litigation in 
each state. Setting the bar at five winning cases per million residents would cause Alabama, 
Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, South Carolina, South Dakota, and 
Texas to be covered.295 All of these states except Montana formerly were covered in part or in 
full by Section 4 or were bailed in under Section 3. 
 
 Similarly, Stephen Ansolabehere and others have written extensively about racial 
polarization in voting,296 which  “increase[s]  the  political  vulnerability  of  racial  and  language 
minorities.”297 The seven states in which white voters preferred McCain to Obama by at least 
forty percentage points in 2008 were Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, and Texas.298 All of these states except Oklahoma used to be covered by Section 
4. And Christopher Elmendorf and Douglas Spencer have focused attention on the persistence of 
racially discriminatory attitudes among white voters, which may make de jure discrimination 
more likely. The six  states  that  have  the  highest  proportions  of  whites  whose  views  of  blacks’  
                                                 
290 I realize, of course, that this may not be an accurate assumption for many members of Congress. 
291 Shelby Cty v Holder, 133 S Ct 2612, 2631 (2013). 
292 For additional efforts to devise new coverage formulas, see Spencer Overton, The Coverage Curve: 
Identifying States at the Bottom of the Class, in Epstein et al, eds, The Future of the Voting Rights Act 242, 245, 252 
(cited in note 8) (employing eight separate metrics and finding that all seven worst-performing states formerly were 
covered in part or in full), and Michael P. McDonald, Who’s  Covered?  Coverage  Formula  and  Bailout, in Epstein et 
al, eds, The Future of the Voting Rights Act 255, 262-67 (cited in note 8) (exploring how coverage would change if 
original formula was updated with current data on voter participation and use of tests or devices). 
293 See Bernard Grofman, Devising a Sensible Trigger for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 12 Election L 
J 332, 334-35 (2013) (using cutoff of ten successful Section 2 challenges and identifying Alabama, Arkansas, 
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia as states that would be covered). 
294 See generally Katz et al, 39 U Mich J L Reform (cited in note 11); Katz, VRA Reauthorization (cited in 
note 39). 
295 See Shelby Cty v Holder, 679 F3d 848, 876 (DC Cir 2012), revd, 133 S Ct 2612 (2013). This figure 
includes both published and unpublished Section 2 decisions from the 1982-2005 period. See id. 
296 See Ansolabehere et al, 123 Harv L Rev 1385 (cited in note 122); see also Stephen Ansolabehere et al, 
Regional Differences in Racial Polarization in the 2012 Presidential Election: Implications for the Constitutionality 
of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 126 Harv L Rev F 205 (2013). 
297 Shelby Cty, 133 S Ct at 2636 (Ginsburg dissenting). 
298 Exit poll data from 2008 is available at Election Center 2008 – Results, CNNPolitics.com (last visited 
Oct 1, 2013),online at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/president/. Unfortunately, 2012 exit poll data is 
not available for all states. 
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intelligence and work ethic are more negative than the national median are Alabama, Louisiana, 
Mississippi, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming.299 All of these states except Wyoming 
previously were covered jurisdictions. 
 
 These metrics have decent hopes of being upheld by the Court because, unlike the 
stricken  Section  4,  they  rely  on  “current  data  reflecting  current  needs.”300 The racial polarization 
and racial attitude figures are only a few years old, while the Section 2 statistics capture cases 
from the last couple decades. The metrics also are attractive because they would neatly close 
most of the Section 2 – Section 5 gap. The majority of the formerly covered jurisdictions once 
again would be subject to preclearance, thus largely restoring the status quo ante.  
 
However, it is unclear whether the Court is willing to countenance any further use of the 
preclearance remedy. Its opinion in Shelby County emphasized that preclearance can be justified 
only  by  “exceptional”  conditions,301 and observed in dicta that the claim that preclearance is now 
inherently  invalid  “ha[s]  a  good  deal  of  force.”302 The probability of Congress passing a new 
coverage formula also is low. Any new formula would sweep in at least a few additional 
jurisdictions, which likely would complain vociferously about their inclusion.303 And even 
formerly covered jurisdictions might object to being singled out by current data that implies that 
they continue to discriminate against minorities.304 
 
B. Section 3 
 
 The second option for shrinking the Section 2 – Section 5 gap is for plaintiffs to use 
Section 3 more aggressively to bail in jurisdictions—or, even better, for Congress to amend the 
provision so that it is easier to satisfy. To date, plaintiffs rarely have invoked Section 3 and 
courts rarely have subjected jurisdictions to preclearance pursuant to it.305 But in the future, 
plaintiffs could insert Section 3 claims into almost all of their voting rights lawsuits.306 If they 
were to prevail on these claims, then a substantial number of jurisdictions would be compelled to 
preclear their election law changes, thus reinstating part of the regime struck down in Shelby 
County. However, even if many Section 3 claims succeeded, the result would be an odd 
patchwork in which coverage corresponded to litigation victories but not necessarily to actual 
racial discrimination in voting. And many claims probably would not succeed because Section 3, 
                                                 
299 See Christopher S. Elmendorf and Douglas M. Spencer, The Geography of Racial Stereotyping: 
Evidence and Implications for VRA Preclearance After Shelby County, 102 Cal L Rev (forthcoming 2014) 
(manuscript at 38). 
300 Shelby Cty, 133 S Ct at 2629. 
301 Id at 2618, 2624, 2630-31. 
302 Id at 2625. 
303 See Persily, 117 Yale L J at  210  (cited  in  note  106)  (“[I]t  is  quite  another  [thing]  to  heap  a  new  and  
costly administrative scheme onto jurisdictions unaccustomed  to  needing  federal  permission  for  their  voting  laws.”). 
304 See id at  211  (noting  that  a  state’s  coverage  under  a  new  formula  would  be  perceived  as  “a  national  
condemnation  of  its  recent  voting  rights  record”). 
305 See note 65 (noting that only two states, Arkansas and New Mexico, ever have been subjected to 
preclearance under Section 3). 
306 Notably, the DOJ already has included Section  3  claims  in  its  challenges  to  Texas’s  photo  ID  law  and  
district plans. See note 219; see also Complaint, United States v Texas (SD Tex Aug 22, 2013), *13. Private parties 
challenging  North  Carolina’s  new  omnibus  franchise  restriction  law  also  have  filed  Section  3  claims.  See, for 
example, Complaint, NAACP v McCrory (MDNC Aug 12, 2013), *31-32. 
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unlike Section 2, requires a judicial finding that a jurisdiction has engaged in intentional 
discrimination.307 Courts often are reluctant to deem a jurisdiction a deliberate discriminator; 
indeed, this was the very reason why Section 2 was revised in 1982 to permit liability based 
solely on discriminatory effects.308 
 
 Both of these shortcomings, though, could be mitigated somewhat by congressional 
action. If Congress were to amend Section 3 so that preclearance applies not only to the 
jurisdiction found to have engaged in discrimination, but also to all of its constituent subunits, 
then bail-in claims would result in more geographically uniform coverage. More importantly, if 
Congress were to make a violation of Section 2 rather than a constitutional breach the trigger for 
Section 3 preclearance, then Section 3 claims would become much easier to win. As Travis 
Crum  has  commented,  “[a]n  effects  test  [for  Section  3]  .  .  .  would  likely  result  in  many  more  
jurisdictions  covered,”  thus  producing  greater  convergence  with  the  former  scope of Section 4.309 
However, Congress may be unable to pass any legislation on the controversial subject of 
preclearance as long as it remains under divided partisan control. Moreover, even a supercharged 
Section 3 would not result in all of the formerly covered jurisdictions once again becoming 
subject to preclearance (barring an unprecedented effusion of voting rights suits). And the Court 
may not look kindly on an attempt to link the Section 3 remedy of preclearance to a violation of 
Section 2. A garden-variety Section 2 offense may not be  sufficiently  “exceptional,”  in  the  
Court’s  view, to justify preclearance.310 
 
C. Section 2 
 
 Congress’s  final  option  for  reducing  the  size  of  the  Section  2  – Section 5 gap—and the 
one that follows most directly from  this  Article’s  analysis—is to amend Section 2 itself so that it 
more closely resembles Section 5. On the procedural side, Congress could (1) institute a burden-
shifting framework under which the onus would switch to the jurisdiction once a plaintiff makes 
a preliminary showing of harm; (2) increase the availability of preliminary injunctions, perhaps 
by authorizing their issuance whenever the preliminary showing is made; and (3) consolidate or 
eliminate some of the elements that must be proven to establish liability (especially the plethora 
of Senate factors). In combination, these steps would address all of the process-related reasons 
why policies that formerly would have been blocked by Section 5 now may go into effect. They 
would make the jurisdiction bear more of the burden of proof; they often would make suspension 
of a policy the default before a decision on the merits is reached; and they would reduce the cost 
and complexity of Section 2 litigation. Section 2 suits would not be identical to Section 5 
preclearance proceedings, but they would be as close as possible while still retaining their 
character as conventional causes of action. 
 
 With respect to vote dilution, similarly, Congress could reverse the Court decisions that 
have made Section 2 inapplicable to districts that are bizarrely shaped or whose minority 
                                                 
307 See 42 USC § 1973(c) (requiring constitutional violation for Section 3 to apply, which in turn requires 
showing of discriminatory intent). 
308 See note 120 and accompanying text. 
309 See Travis Crum, Note, The  Voting  Rights  Act’s  Secret Weapon: Pocket Trigger Litigation and Dynamic 
Preclearance, 119 Yale L J 1992, 2037 (2010). 
310 See id (“But  this  change  may  also  make  section  3  more  vulnerable  to  constitutional  attack.”). 
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populations are overly heterogeneous or below 50 percent in size. If Congress undid these 
decisions, then there generally would be Section 2 liability if a constituency in which minorities 
were able to elect the candidate of their choice was dismantled. There generally would be 
Section 2 liability, that is, in the exact circumstances in which there is retrogression under 
Section 5. The shape of a district and the makeup and magnitude of its minority population 
would be immaterial under both provisions. Lastly, with respect to vote denial, Congress could 
make disparate impact alone the standard for a Section 2 violation (in this case without 
disturbing any Court precedents). The criteria for liability under Section 2 and retrogression 
under Section 5 then would be identical. Additional elements such as causation or interaction 
with patterns of discrimination would not have to be demonstrated under either provision. 
 
 These Section 2 revisions may be easier for Congress to pass than changes to Section 3 or 
Section 4 because they do not aim to impose preclearance on any jurisdiction. It is preclearance, 
with its attendant loss of state sovereignty, that always has been the most provocative feature of 
the VRA, and it is preclearance whose salience recently was heightened by Shelby County. 
Responses to the decision that focus on other aspects of the VRA therefore may be more 
palatable in the current political environment. In 1982, notably, a divided Congress and a 
Republican President managed to enact more sweeping amendments to Section 2 than those 
proposed here after an earlier Court case limited both constitutional and statutory claims of vote 
dilution.311 Political dynamics have changed over the last generation, but this is still an 
auspicious precedent. 
 
 Revisions to Section 2 have the further advantage that they may be more likely to survive 
the  Court’s  scrutiny  than  efforts  to  recreate  the  preclearance  regime. There is now a decision on 
the books striking down the only coverage formula ever passed by Congress and casting doubt 
on the validity of preclearance under any circumstances. But there is no equivalently adverse 
decision in the Section 2 context. Individual Justices occasionally have expressed their 
dissatisfaction with the provision,312 but the full Court never has implied that it is 
unconstitutional. Accordingly, a procedurally streamlined and substantively strengthened Section 
2 would have reasonable odds of repelling a constitutional attack. None of the changes advocated 
here would make the provision much more legally vulnerable than it already is. 
 
 On the other hand, that Congress is more likely to amend Section 2 than Section 3 or 
Section 4 does not mean that it actually is likely to do so. Congressional inaction is always the 
safest bet in periods of divided government, especially with respect to laws that touch on highly 
sensitive issues of race and political power. The case for the constitutionality of a fortified 
Section 2 also is far from ironclad. Because it is a disparate impact provision, Section 2 already 
prohibits a wide range of conduct that is not motivated by invidious intent and thus is 
constitutionally permissible. If it were revised to prohibit even more such conduct, one could 
easily imagine the Court that decided Shelby County concluding  that  it  too  exceeds  Congress’s  
                                                 
311 The Court decision targeted by the 1982 amendments was City of Mobile v Bolden, 446 US 55 (1980), 
which made discriminatory intent the standard for constitutional vote dilution and construed Section 2 as mirroring 
the constitutional test. 
312 See, for example, Holder v Hall, 512 US 874, 891-945 (1994) (Thomas concurring in the judgment); 
Chisom v Roemer, 501 US 380, 418 (1991) (Kennedy dissenting). 
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enforcement powers under the Reconstruction Amendments.313 A reinforced Section 2 might 
clash  as  well  with  the  Court’s  ban  on  racial  gerrymandering, which forbids race from playing too 
large a role in districting decisions. Indeed, Justice Kennedy warned in Bartlett that, “[i]f  §  2  
were  interpreted  to  require  crossover  districts  throughout  the  Nation,  ‘it  would  unnecessarily  
infuse race into  virtually  every  redistricting,  raising  serious  constitutional  questions.’”314 
 
 One final (though unlikely) scenario for strengthening Section 2 also should be noted. In 
the event that Congress is unable to act, the Court itself could eliminate much of the Section 2 – 
Section 5 gap by revisiting its Section 2 precedents and deciding open questions in favor of 
greater liability.315 On the procedural front, the Court probably could not change the burden of 
proof or the availability of preliminary injunctions—which are set, respectively, by the statutory 
text316 and  by  unrelated  case  law  on  courts’  equitable powers317—but it could greatly simplify 
the elements that must be proven to establish a Section 2 violation. The profusion of these 
elements is squarely the fault  of  the  Court’s  own  decisions,  not  the  language  of  Section  2,318 
meaning that doctrinal rationalization could be accomplished through judicial intervention. With 
respect to vote dilution, likewise, it is the Court, not the statutory text, that has produced the 
geographic compactness, minority heterogeneity, and minority size requirements for 
redistricting.319 The Court therefore could waive these requirements even if Congress remains 
inactive. And with respect to vote denial, the Court has not yet specified the standard for Section 
2 liability, and the language of the provision does not resolve the matter either.320 The Court thus 
would be writing on a clean slate if it were to embrace disparate impact alone as the operative 
test. 
 
 Of course, there is little chance that the same Court that consistently has narrowed the 
scope of Section 2 over the last generation suddenly will change course. It probably would take a 
shift  in  the  Court’s  membership  for  it  to  begin  loosening  the  procedural  and  substantive  
                                                 
313 For  an  extended  discussion  of  whether  Section  2  constitutes  a  valid  exercise  of  Congress’s  enforcement  
powers, see Luke P. McLoughlin, Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and City of Boerne: The Continuity, Proximity, 
and Trajectory of Vote-Dilution Standards, 31 Vt L Rev 39 (2006). 
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author). 
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added)). 
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318 See notes 79-83 and accompanying text (summarizing array of judicially created elements of Section 2 
claim). 
319 See Sections II.A.1-3. 
320 See Section III.A. 
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limitations that it has imposed on Section 2 over the years.321 Judicial revision of Section 2 
doctrine also is complicated by the “special  force”  of  stare  decisis  in  the  statutory  interpretation  
context.322 Because Congress is free to overturn statutory constructions of which it 
disapproves—a power it repeatedly has exercised vis-à-vis the VRA323—the Court tends to 
adhere to its rulings unless they have proven manifestly unworkable. Strikingly, there does not 
seem to be a single instance in which the Court explicitly has reversed one of its earlier readings 
of the VRA. 
 
* * * 
 
 The upshot of this analysis is that there are no easy ways to close the Section 2 – Section 
5 gap. There are no options, that is, that are clearly effective from a policy perspective, passable 
by Congress given the current political climate, and likely to survive review by the Court. This 
conclusion should not be especially surprising. A provision as potent as Section 5 is hard to 
replace, a divided government typically enacts little legislation of any kind, and the Court cannot 
be expected to turn a blind eye to attempts to sidestep Shelby County when the ink on the 
decision is barely dry. But the conclusion also does not necessarily apply in the long run. If 
Democrats were to win unified control of the federal government, and if  the  Court’s  membership  
were to shift in a more progressive direction, then there would be a high likelihood that 
amendments to the VRA would be both passed and upheld. Accordingly, the Section 2 – Section 
5 gap probably will persist in the short term. But it need not endure indefinitely. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Everyone agrees that Shelby County inaugurated a new era in the South. As Heather 
Gerken  commented  on  the  day  of  the  decision,  the  future  “will  look nothing like what existed at 
9:59  this  morning,  before  the  Court  handed  down  its  opinion.”324 But until now there has been no 
systematic effort to figure out what the new era actually will look like—what the state of 
minority representation will be now that Section 5 has been struck down but Section 2 lives on. 
In this Article, I have tried my hand at charting the contours of the unfamiliar legal and political 
landscape in which we now find ourselves. The conclusions of my investigation are sobering if 
not quite calamitous. Procedurally, Section 2 and Section 5 diverge in several major ways, all of 
which mean that policies that formerly would have been blocked now will go into effect. With 
respect to vote dilution, many districts that previously were protected now may (and probably 
will) be dismantled without running afoul of Section 2. And with respect to vote denial, many 
                                                 
321 See Pildes, 68 Ohio St L J at 1140-41  (cited  in  note  103)  (noting  that  “a  majority  of  the  Court  has  
continuously sought, without interruption, to cabin and confine safe minority districting to a narrower and narrower 
domain”). 
322 Patterson v McLean Credit Union, 491 US 164, 172 (1989). 
323 In 1982, Congress reversed a Court decision limiting Section 2 to liability for discriminatory intent, see 
note 120, and in 2006, Congress reversed Court decisions confining Section 5 to cases in which a retrogressive 
purpose  was  shown  or  minorities’  overall  political  influence  was  diminished,  see notes 127-128. 
324 Heather Gerken, Goodbye to the Crown Jewel of the Civil Rights Movement, Slate (June 25, 2013), 
online at 
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franchise restrictions that used to be barred now may (and probably will) be enacted with legal 
impunity. 
 
 To some, this new era may seem worse than the regime it replaced. But there do exist 
measures that could largely restore the status quo ante. A new coverage formula could be 
adopted, preclearance could be imposed on offending jurisdictions pursuant to a more flexible 
bail-in provision, and Section 2 could be amended to mirror the stricken Section 5 more 
faithfully. However, all of these steps face serious legal and political obstacles, at least for the 
time being. A divided government is unlikely to pass legislation that may have uneven partisan 
consequences. Likewise, the current Court probably would thwart any efforts to circumvent its 
recent decision. Section Two minus Section Five thus may come to equal zero once again. But 
odds are it will not do so for a while.  
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APPENDIX 
 
TABLE 1: DISTRICTS FORMERLY PROTECTED UNDER SECTION 5 
 
State Minority 
CVAP % 
Congress: 
Total 
Districts 
Congress: 
Section 5 
Districts 
State 
Senate: 
Total 
Districts 
State 
Senate: 
Section 5 
Districts 
State 
House: 
Total 
Districts 
State 
House: 
Section 5 
Districts 
Alabama 26.6% 7 1 35 8 105 28 
Arizona 22.4% 9 2 30 6 60 10 
Georgia 33.5% 14 4 56 16 180 57 
Louisiana 32.9% 6 1 39 11 105 29 
Mississippi 36.3% 4 1 52 15 122 42 
North Carolina 24.0% 13 2 50 10 120 25 
South Carolina 29.2% 7 1 46 11 124 32 
Texas 38.7% 36 12 31 10 150 51 
Virginia 23.0% 11 1 40 5 100 13 
Total 31.1% 107 25 379 92 1066 287 
 
Districts formerly protected under Section 5 either (1) have a combined minority CVAP above 
50 percent or (2) have a combined minority CVAP above 40 percent and are represented by a 
minority member. 
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TABLE 2: HIGHLY NON-COMPACT ABILITY DISTRICTS 
 
District Dispersion  Regularity 
AL Senate 18 0.14 0.13 
GA Senate 39 0.14 0.11 
GA House 55 0.15 0.12 
GA House 57 0.14 0.12 
GA House 83 0.14 0.12 
GA House 84 0.13 0.09 
LA Senate 29 0.12 0.04 
LA House 21 0.11 0.05 
NC Congress 1 0.29 0.04 
NC Congress 12 0.07 0.03 
NC Senate 21 0.34 0.05 
NC House 7 0.28 0.04 
NC House 12 0.12 0.05 
NC House 48 0.23 0.04 
SC House 109 0.11 0.11 
SC House 113 0.12 0.13 
TX Congress 15 0.15 0.12 
TX Congress 33 0.23 0.05 
TX Congress 35 0.10 0.05 
TX House 131 0.14 0.15 
TX House 145 0.13 0.11 
VA House 95 0.14 0.14 
 
List includes all ability districts in formerly covered areas with dispersion scores less than or 
equal to 0.15 or regularity scores less than or equal to 0.05. 
  
58 
 
TABLE 3: RESULTS OF FACTOR ANALYSIS 
 
Variable Composite Factor 1 (Socioeconomic Status) 
Median Age  
Married Household % 0.65 
Nonfamily Household % -0.50 
High School Enrollment %  
College Enrollment %  
Median Household Income 0.54 
Occupation – Professional % 0.41 
Occupation – Sales %  
Occupation – Construction %  
Occupation – Manufacturing %  
Owner-Occupied % 0.90 
Renter-Occupied % -0.90 
  
Variance Explained 35.1% 
 
Nine states (AL, AZ, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TX, VA) and 38,381 Census block groups 
incorporated into analysis. 
 
All variables apply to combined African American and Hispanic populations. 
 
Single retained factor explains 35.1 percent of variance in data. 
 
Only loadings greater than 0.4 or less than -0.4 displayed. 
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TABLE 4: ABILITY DISTRICTS WITH HIGHLY SPATIALLY DIVERSE MINORITY POPULATIONS 
 
District Spatial Diversity Minority Dispersion 
AL Congress 7 0.83 0.59 
AL Senate 18 0.88 0.33 
AL Senate 19 0.81 0.49 
AL Senate 26 0.90 0.81 
AL House 19 0.89 0.51 
AL House 52 0.86 0.39 
AL House 53 0.99 0.50 
AL House 54 0.98 0.25 
AL House 55 0.78 0.24 
AL House 60 0.98 0.27 
AL House 76 0.83 0.47 
AL House 77 1.01 0.40 
AL House 78 0.88 0.27 
AL House 83 0.80 0.57 
AZ Congress 7 0.79 0.72 
AZ Senate 3 0.82 0.61 
AZ House 3 0.82 0.61 
AZ House 3 0.82 0.61 
GA Congress 2 0.80 0.63 
GA Congress 4 0.91 0.60 
GA Congress 5 0.86 0.58 
GA Congress 13 0.79 0.30 
GA Senate 2 0.83 0.87 
GA Senate 5 0.89 0.39 
GA Senate 15 0.84 0.63 
GA Senate 22 0.89 0.78 
GA Senate 26 0.80 0.53 
GA Senate 34 0.90 0.41 
GA Senate 38 0.86 0.43 
GA Senate 39 0.88 0.19 
GA Senate 41 1.01 0.33 
GA Senate 43 0.80 0.61 
GA House 55 0.87 0.14 
GA House 61 0.88 0.19 
GA House 62 0.83 0.14 
GA House 63 0.82 0.12 
GA House 64 0.83 0.21 
GA House 66 0.87 0.51 
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GA House 74 0.85 0.38 
GA House 84 0.92 0.11 
GA House 86 0.85 0.25 
GA House 87 0.92 0.23 
GA House 88 1.13 0.20 
GA House 91 0.84 0.39 
GA House 100 0.79 0.72 
GA House 132 0.85 0.57 
GA House 136 0.88 0.37 
GA House 142 0.85 0.70 
GA House 153 0.87 0.53 
GA House 162 0.82 0.32 
GA House 163 0.82 0.36 
LA Congress 2 0.87 0.59 
LA Senate 3 0.79 0.20 
LA Senate 4 0.86 0.46 
LA Senate 7 1.04 0.49 
LA Senate 15 0.92 0.52 
LA House 4 0.90 0.32 
LA House 34 0.78 0.80 
LA House 61 0.79 0.52 
LA House 87 0.83 0.37 
LA House 97 0.84 0.44 
LA House 99 0.80 0.35 
LA House 100 0.92 0.88 
LA House 101 1.01 0.47 
LA House 102 0.98 0.34 
MS Senate 26 0.86 0.21 
MS Senate 29 0.97 0.23 
MS House 45 0.81 0.29 
MS House 55 0.91 0.73 
MS House 57 0.86 0.37 
MS House 66 0.85 0.28 
MS House 69 0.81 0.25 
MS House 71 0.80 0.40 
MS House 72 0.96 0.22 
NC Congress 12 0.87 0.51 
NC Senate 14 0.97 0.69 
NC Senate 20 0.95 0.44 
NC Senate 21 0.79 0.54 
NC Senate 28 0.88 0.74 
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NC Senate 32 0.91 0.88 
NC Senate 38 0.84 0.41 
NC Senate 40 0.85 0.60 
NC House 29 0.89 0.72 
NC House 31 0.95 0.54 
NC House 33 0.94 0.57 
NC House 38 0.92 0.57 
NC House 42 0.82 0.48 
NC House 57 0.98 0.57 
NC House 58 0.84 0.44 
NC House 60 0.85 0.59 
NC House 71 0.96 0.59 
NC House 72 0.85 0.71 
NC House 99 0.84 0.57 
NC House 101 0.83 0.48 
NC House 107 0.87 0.30 
SC Senate 7 0.89 0.61 
SC Senate 19 0.87 0.58 
SC Senate 21 0.89 0.53 
SC House 12 0.80 0.57 
SC House 73 0.82 0.41 
SC House 76 0.92 0.33 
SC House 111 0.83 0.44 
TX Congress 9 0.99 0.43 
TX Congress 16 0.81 0.87 
TX Congress 18 0.85 0.41 
TX Congress 20 0.83 0.61 
TX Congress 30 0.88 0.58 
TX Congress 33 0.79 0.46 
TX Congress 35 0.84 0.35 
TX Senate 6 0.79 0.48 
TX Senate 13 0.95 0.36 
TX Senate 15 0.94 0.28 
TX Senate 21 0.81 0.20 
TX Senate 23 0.86 0.68 
TX Senate 26 0.81 0.60 
TX House 34 0.79 0.59 
TX House 42 0.78 0.80 
TX House 46 0.86 0.46 
TX House 51 0.95 0.68 
TX House 77 0.80 0.69 
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TX House 95 0.84 0.43 
TX House 100 0.82 0.30 
TX House 101 1.01 0.40 
TX House 103 0.85 0.39 
TX House 111 1.00 0.33 
TX House 116 0.85 0.30 
TX House 120 0.80 0.65 
TX House 123 0.81 0.34 
TX House 131 0.93 0.16 
TX House 139 0.85 0.28 
TX House 141 0.92 0.28 
TX House 142 0.79 0.24 
TX House 145 0.82 0.20 
TX House 146 0.89 0.26 
TX House 147 0.86 0.24 
VA Congress 3 0.85 0.59 
VA Senate 2 0.84 0.49 
VA Senate 5 0.91 0.49 
VA Senate 9 0.95 0.29 
VA Senate 16 0.82 0.50 
VA Senate 18 0.86 0.25 
VA House 70 0.98 0.33 
VA House 74 0.85 0.14 
VA House 77 0.98 0.24 
VA House 80 0.89 0.46 
VA House 95 0.85 0.35 
 
List includes all ability districts in formerly covered areas with spatial diversity scores higher 
than remedial district rejected in LULAC (0.78). 
 
Spatial diversity scores computed with respect to composite factor 1 (socioeconomic status) from 
factor analysis. 
 
Spatial diversity  and  dispersion  scores  computed  for  districts’  minority  populations  only. 
 
Districts with minority dispersion scores lower than remedial district rejected in LULAC (0.18) 
shown in bold. 
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TABLE 5: ABILITY DISTRICTS WITH COMBINED MINORITY CVAPS BELOW 50 PERCENT 
 
District Black CVAP % Hispanic CVAP % Combined Minority 
CVAP % 
AL House 85 46.7% 1.1% 47.8% 
AZ Senate 2 4.4% 42.3% 46.8% 
AZ Senate 3 3.0% 44.7% 47.7% 
AZ Senate 30 8.1% 33.9% 42.0% 
AZ House 2 4.4% 42.3% 46.8% 
AZ House 3 3.0% 44.7% 47.7% 
AZ House 3 3.0% 44.7% 47.7% 
AZ House 4 3.5% 46.2% 49.7% 
GA House 38 40.0% 6.5% 46.5% 
GA House 66 37.5% 2.8% 40.3% 
GA House 132 42.9% 1.5% 44.3% 
NC Senate 32 45.3% 4.2% 49.5% 
SC Senate 7 46.2% 2.6% 48.8% 
SC Senate 29 46.9% 0.7% 47.6% 
SC House 90 43.4% 0.6% 44.0% 
SC House 116 45.1% 1.3% 46.4% 
VA House 52 31.0% 12.2% 43.2% 
 
List includes all ability districts in formerly covered areas with combined minority CVAPs 
below 50 percent. 
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TABLE 6: FRANCHISE RESTRICTIONS UNDER SECTION 2 AND SECTION 5 (1982 – PRESENT) 
 
Policy Section 5 Preclearance 
Denials 
Section 2 Successful 
Claims 
Section 2 Failed Claims 
Polling place eliminations 19 3 3 
Election date changes 15 0 0 
Voter registration 
procedures 
10 5 4 
Bilingual election 
procedures 
10 2 0 
Voter roll purges 5 0 1 
Lack of assistance to 
voters 
4 2 2 
Photo ID laws 3 0 2 
Absentee voting 
procedures 
3 2 4 
Cutbacks to voting hours  2 1 1 
Voting machine problems 1 3 2 
Citizenship requirements 
for registration 
1 0 0 
Total 73 18 19 
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